This article, authored by Mark Moldenhauer, originally appeared in the December 10, 2012 issue of the Buffalo Law Journal.

With calendars flipped to December, many companies are putting the final touches on holiday party plans.  These celebrations offer an opportunity to unwind, socialize, and reflect on the achievements of the past year, all outside of the hectic business environment.  Employers need to be aware, however, that holiday functions also raise a host of potential legal problems, especially when alcohol is served.  So while the trimmings and trappings deserve due attention, prudent employers should also consider ways to minimize the chance for a legal hangover.

1.  Boughs of Holly Are Fine -- Forget the Mistletoe!

Some people tend to exude an excessive amount of cheer during the holiday season.  Stories abound about executives dancing provocatively with interns or messengers flirting with the CEO’s spouse.  While no one wants to bah-humbug the festivities, it is important for employers to keep in mind that many of the same rules that apply in the workplace must be enforced at holiday parties.  This includes policies that prohibit sexual and other forms of harassment.

If you rely on a vendor or banquet facility to coordinate the event, be explicit that you intend this to be a professional function (yes, ask the DJ for a set list).  While gag gifts and "roasting" speeches might be popular, a fine line exists between good-natured ribbing and public humiliation.  Ideally, any gifts and planned remarks should be vetted and approved in advance.  Few things ring in the New Year worse than a hostile work environment or discrimination lawsuit.

2.  Take It Easy on the Eggnog

Whether it is loosening inhibitions or causing problems after-the-fact, alcohol is frequently the cause of holiday party problems.  As the sponsor, an employer must be keenly aware of the risks posed by serving alcohol and consider different options to reduce those risks.

In New York and several other states, “social hosts” are generally not liable for alcohol-related accidents or injuries suffered off-premises by third parties.  This is not the case in every state, so an employer should familiarize itself with the applicable law where the function is being held.  Also keep in mind that when revelers cross state lines, a claim might arise in one jurisdiction even though the host would not be liable to third parties in the state where the party actually occurred (for instance, a party in New York followed by an accident in New Jersey).  In addition, employees and guests under the age of 21 must never be served alcohol.  Many states, including New York, specifically allow claims against social hosts when alcohol is served illegally.  For this and other reasons, employers should insist that bartenders check ID or use some other system to ensure that they are not giving alcohol to underage attendees.

As for injuries suffered after the party by inebriated employees or guests, courts will typically find that a person’s voluntary intoxication caused his or her injury.  This includes situations where an employee or guest gets hurt in a motor vehicle accident.  Of course, this does nothing to lessen the non-legal consequences of someone becoming injured or worse while driving home from a holiday party.

On-premises injuries are a different story.  An employer has a duty to prevent harm to those on its property and in areas under its control, which could include an off-site facility that the employer leases for its holiday party.  If the employer learns that an employee or guest is intoxicated or otherwise acting inappropriately, reasonable steps should be taken to prevent the situation from escalating.

An employer-sponsored holiday party will almost certainly be considered as relating to employment, even if attendance is voluntary.  As a result, the exclusive remedy for an employee who suffers an injury at the party will normally be workers’ compensation benefits.  That said, injuries caused solely by alcohol consumption are normally deemed non-compensable under most workers’ compensation laws, including New York’s.  Also, injuries suffered in a car accident during an employee’s drive home will not likely be covered since commuting is generally considered outside the scope of employment for workers’ compensation purposes.

3.  Make Your List . . . and Check it Twice

 Without a doubt, holiday parties have their advantages, including the positive impact on employee morale.  Employers are encouraged, however, to do some advance planning in order to at least reduce potential risks.  Taking proactive steps will hopefully allow everyone to enjoy themselves, both during and after the party.

In addition to the measures discussed above, consider taking the following steps to help ensure that your festivities remain safe and jolly:

• Arrange transportation to and from the event or notify employees and guests that the company will cover cab fare;
• Coordinate discounted rates for employees and guests with nearby hotels;
• If the party is on the employer’s premises, hire a professional bartender or caterer and confirm that they carry sufficient liability insurance;
• Instruct bartenders to serve conservatively, “cut off” anyone who appears intoxicated and prohibit employees and guests from serving drinks;
• Limit the amount of alcohol served by providing non-alcoholic options, reducing the hours of open bar, giving attendees vouchers for drinks or using a cash bar;
• Recruit spotters to watch for excessive drinking and other inappropriate behavior;
• Serve foods that are rich in starch or protein to slow the absorption of alcohol and avoid salty foods that encourage people to drink;
• Contact your insurance carriers to discuss whether current policies provide sufficient coverage and, if not, purchase a product that will;
• Consider alternative formats which discourage heavy drinking, such as a breakfast or lunch function or a party with significant others and children;
• Advise employees that attendance is strictly voluntary and refrain from activities that can be viewed as compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act;
• Schedule the party on a day that will not conflict with any employee’s religious observances; and, last but not least,
• Remember:  “Holiday Party” not “Christmas Party”!  Most workplaces are incredibly diverse and comprised of individuals who celebrate a variety of religious and secular holidays.  Do not engender feelings of exclusion by emphasizing one particular set of traditions or beliefs.

It is commonly accepted by employment law practitioners that Fair Labor Standards Act settlements must be approved by the United States Department of Labor or court-supervised to be enforceable.  However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected this prevailing belief and upheld a private settlement on the grounds that it resolved a “bona fide dispute as to the number of hours worked,” rather than constituting a waiver of plaintiffs’ substantive FLSA rights.

In Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Productions, LLC, the plaintiffs, who were represented by a union, claimed they were not properly paid overtime while working on the set of a movie.  The union filed a grievance on the plaintiffs’ behalf claiming they had not been paid for all hours worked and conducted an investigation that concluded it would be impossible to determine whether plaintiffs actually worked on all the days claimed.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed a lawsuit in June 2009.  In November 2009, the defendants and plaintiffs’ union representatives entered into a settlement agreement resolving plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.  Because the settlement was not approved by the USDOL or a court, the plaintiffs argued that the FLSA releases were not enforceable.

The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment finding the FLSA releases to be valid and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  In so holding, the Circuit Court held that the plaintiffs were bound by the terms of the settlement agreement even though they did not sign it because both the settlement and the collective bargaining agreement stated that the union was the plaintiffs’ authorized representative.  The Court further noted that the plaintiffs accepted and cashed their settlement checks, and the fact that the plaintiffs were represented by a union and the settlement was reached during the course of pending litigation minimized any suggestion of unequal bargaining power between the parties.

Employers are often confronted with the issue of how best to resolve an FLSA claim out of court, and specifically whether it should obtain a release knowing that such a release would most likely be unenforceable.  The Fifth Circuit decision is encouraging as it may pave the way for other courts to enforce private FLSA settlement agreements using the specific factual findings there as a road map for employers to follow, particularly in the unionized setting.

The case also serves as a good opportunity to remind New York employers that private settlement agreements releasing minimum wage and overtime claims under the New York Labor Law are generally enforceable.  Furthermore, even if an FLSA release may be deemed unenforceable, there may be certain provisions an employer may want to include in a private settlement agreement that might be helpful in defending any subsequent litigation.  For example, it may be helpful to include certain affirmative acknowledgments with respect to the employee's duties and/or the employee's hours worked depending on the type of claim being asserted.

The New York Court of Appeals recently found that a municipality’s unique and local interest in maintaining strong disciplinary authority over its police force outweighs the policy of the State to support public employees’ collective bargaining rights.  This means that critical issues involving the manner in which police disciplinary investigations, charges, and hearings are conducted may not be subject to either the negotiation process or, perhaps more importantly, interest arbitration.  These matters are prohibited subjects of bargaining.

In Town of Wallkill v. Civil Service Employees Association, which was decided on October 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals upheld a local law passed by the Town of Wallkill in 2007 under authority provided by New York Town Law Section 155.  The local law gave the Town Board the power to make a final determination on police disciplinary charges and to impose a disciplinary penalty.  The local law was adopted without the agreement of the Town of Wallkill Police Officers' Benevolent Association ("PBA").  The PBA preferred to maintain the neutral arbitrator disciplinary process which had been in its collective bargaining agreement with the Town since 1995.

The Court of Appeals found its 2006 decision in Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of City of New York v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board to be dispositive in the Town of Wallkill case.  In Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, the Court of Appeals held that "police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials.”  Prior to Town of Wallkill, the Court of Appeals' 2006 decision had been mainly applied to special State law disciplinary constructs that pre-dated the enactment of New York Civil Service Law Sections 75 and 76 -- the general statutory mechanism for public employee (including police officer) discipline.

In Town of Wallkill, however, the Court of Appeals utilized its rationale and policy from Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, as well as statutory language found in Civil Service Law Section 76(4), to hold that New York Town Law Section 155, a general State law that was enacted prior to Civil Service Law Sections 75 and 76, gives towns "the power and authority to adopt and make rules and regulations for the examination, hearing, investigation and determination of charges, made or preferred against any member or members of such police department."

Thus, where, as in Town of Wallkill, a town enacts a local law which sets forth disciplinary procedures for members of its police force, such enactment can take place without negotiation with the local union and/or without regard to procedures which may already exist in a collective bargaining agreement.  A question can now be raised as to whether the rationale of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Town of Wallkill can also be applied to many New York State villages, as New York Village Law Section 8-804 is nearly identical, in relevant part, to New York Town Law Section 155.

Guidance from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, issued on October 12, 2012, cautions employers that federal employment discrimination laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act may apply in certain situations involving applicants or employees who experience domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking.  This guidance, which is provided in a Q&A format, contains examples of such employment situations.

As employers are aware, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and the ADA prohibits employment discrimination based on disability.  These laws do not specifically protect individuals who experience domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking.  In its guidance, the EEOC recognized this, but cautioned that "potential employment discrimination and retaliation against these individuals may be overlooked.”

In the Q&A, the EEOC addresses three protections under Title VII which may be implicated in a situation that may involve domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking:  (1) disparate treatment based on sex (including treatment based on sex-based stereotypes); (2) sexual or sex-based harassment; and (3) retaliation for engaging in protected activity.  The guidance provides several illustrations of employment decisions that may violate Title VII, including:  an employer terminating an employee who was subjected to domestic violence because the employer fears the “drama battered women bring to the workplace”; and an employer declining to hire a male applicant after learning he had obtained a restraining order against his male domestic partner because the employer believes that men should be able to protect themselves.

The EEOC also addresses a number of protections under the ADA, including the prohibition against different treatment or harassment at work based on an actual or perceived impairment that may result from domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking.  As an example, the EEOC guidance provides that an employer who refuses to hire an applicant after finding out she received counseling for depression due to a sexual assault might be found to be in violation of the ADA.  The EEOC guidance also reminds employers that reasonable accommodations must be made for any disabilities that result from domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking.

The EEOC guidance does not change the existing protected categories or prohibitions under Title VII or the ADA.  Instead, the EEOC guidance provides employers with a reminder that those laws may be implicated in situations where an employee or applicant is a victim of domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking.  Employers in New York should also be aware that the New York Human Rights Law was amended in 2009 to include a specific prohibition against discrimination based on domestic violence victim status.

Earlier this year, many employers were left scratching their heads after a National Labor Relations Board Administrative Law Judge ruled, in American Red Cross Arizona Blood Services Region, that an employer’s handbook acknowledgment, requiring employees to affirm the at-will nature of their employment, violated the National Labor Relations Act.  The language that was found to be unlawful in Red Cross stated:

I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way.

The ALJ reasoned that this language required employees to waive their Section 7 rights to engage in protected concerted activity, because by agreeing that their at-will status could never change, they were essentially foregoing their right to make efforts or engage in conduct that could result in union representation and in a collective bargaining agreement.  This waiver, according to the ALJ, would have a chilling effect on employees’ rights, and was therefore unlawful.

The confusion and concern among employers continued, as the Board continued to file and process complaints against employers for employment-at-will policies that appeared to contain the most routine at-will language.  For example, in late February, another Board complaint challenged the following language:

I acknowledge that no oral or written statements or representations regarding my employment can alter my at-will employment status, except for a written statement signed by me and either [the Company’s] Executive Vice-President/Chief Operating Officer or [the Company’s] President.

The complaint challenging this language was settled before the Board issued a decision, providing employers no guidance as to whether it was time to revise their handbooks.  Thankfully, the Board has now provided some further guidance, and it appears they have tempered their position.  This “treat,” issued on Halloween, came in the form of two Advice Memoranda (Case 32-CA-086799 and Case 28-CA-084365) issued by the Board’s Division of Advice taking the position that language similar to that above is lawful.  For example, the following language was found acceptable:

No manager, supervisor, or employee of [the Company] has any authority to enter into an agreement for employment for any specified period of time or to make an agreement for employment other than at-will.  Only the president of the Company has the authority to make any such agreement and then only in writing.

The memorandum explains that this language is lawful because it is not as absolute as the language in the Red Cross case.  It explicitly permits the president to enter into written employment agreements, thus providing for the possibility of potential modification of the at-will relationship through a collective bargaining agreement.  Additionally, the language is not written in a way that requires employees to waive their rights.

For now, employers should consider reviewing the at-will language in their employee handbooks.  Language that simply describes the at-will status of employees, and states that it can only be altered in writing by an executive should not cause concern for now.  However, if the at-will language is written in more absolute terms, providing that the at-will relationship can never be changed under any circumstances, it may be time to revise that policy.  However, as warned by the Board’s General Counsel at the close of both Advice Memoranda, “the law in this area remains unsettled.”  We will continue to provide updates on this blog as this issue develops.

On October 23, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board held, in a 2-1 decision, that an employer has an obligation under the National Labor Relations Act to respond in a timely manner to a union information request, even if the requested information is ultimately found to be irrelevant to the union's performance of its duties as the employees' collective bargaining representative.

In IronTiger Logistics, Inc., the employer was a unionized trucking company that shared common ownership with another non-union trucking company called TruckMovers.com, Inc.  The union representing IronTiger's employees made a written request to IronTiger that principally sought information regarding the non-union truck drivers employed by TruckMovers.  The information request also sought some information relating to bargaining unit employees, such as the names of the truck drivers for each unit, their destination and mileage, and communications from customers about those units.

IronTiger did not respond to the union's information request until approximately four and a half months later -- after the union had filed an unfair labor practice charge over IronTiger's failure to provide a response to the information request.  In its response, IronTiger did not provide any of the requested information, but instead stated its belief that all of the requested information was irrelevant.

The Administrative Law Judge who presided over the unfair labor practice hearing agreed with IronTiger that the information requested by the union was irrelevant to the union's performance of its duties as the employees' collective bargaining representative.  In addition, there was no dispute regarding the adequacy of IronTiger's response explaining why the requested information was irrelevant.  However, the ALJ nevertheless held that IronTiger's failure to respond in some manner to the irrelevant information request for approximately four and a half months constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.

The two-member majority of the Board agreed with the ALJ's analysis, and held that employers have an obligation under the Act to respond within a reasonable time to union information requests, regardless of whether those requests are deemed to be irrelevant.  Member Hayes wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he reasoned:  "Ultimately, requested information is either legally relevant to a union's representative duties, or it is not.  If it is not relevant, then the statutory duty to bargain in good faith is not implicated by the request or the employer's failure to respond timely to the request."

Based on the Board's IronTiger decision, employers should make sure to respond within a reasonable time in some manner to all information requests made by a union representing their employees, even if the response is just a brief explanation of the employer's position that the requested information is irrelevant.  If an employer believes that a union information request is overly broad or unduly burdensome, the employer should make a good faith effort to work with the union to narrow the scope of the request.

As campaign ads, mailings, and yard signs flood New York, voters across the State are constantly reminded that election season is upon us.  With the general election only a few weeks away, it is also a reminder to employers that New York’s Election Leave Law requires all employers to post a voting leave notice at least ten (10) working days before “every election.”  This year, the general election will be held on November 6, 2012.  Therefore, employers must, if they have not already done so, post a notice no later than October 23, 2012.

A sample of the notice required under the New York Election Law can be found on the New York State Board of Elections’ website.  This notice must be posted at least ten (10) working days before the election “conspicuously in the place of work where it can be seen as employees come or go to their place of work” and must remain in place until the polls close on Election Day.  The Election Law requires the notice to be posted before “every election” – not just general elections – so employers should consider whether to keep this notice posted throughout the year.

In addition to posting the notice, employers should also make sure to afford employees voting leave when obligated to do so.  Under New York Election Law § 3-110, registered voters are entitled to take up to two (2) hours of paid time off from work if they do not have “sufficient time" outside of their working hours to vote.  If the registered voter has four (4) consecutive hours either between the opening of the polls and the beginning of the working shift, or between the end of the working shift and the closing of the polls, it will be assumed that the voter has sufficient time to vote.  (For general elections, the polls in New York State open at 6:00 a.m. and close at 9:00 p.m.).

However, the voter is not automatically entitled to take paid time off to vote if he or she does not have four consecutive hours at the beginning or at the end of the working shift.  The voter must still show that the time he or she has at the beginning or at the end of the working shift is not sufficient to vote.  If the voter can make such a showing, the voter will be entitled to take only as much paid time off (up to a maximum of two (2) hours) that, when added to the voting time the voter has outside working hours, will enable the individual to vote.  Furthermore, New York’s Election Leave Law requires employees to notify the employer at least two (2) working days, but not more than ten (10) working days, prior to the election of the need for voting leave.  For this year’s general election, requests for time off to vote should be made between Tuesday, October 23, 2012 and Friday, November 2, 2012.  The employer may designate that this paid leave be taken off at the beginning or the end of the working shift, unless there is another mutually-agreed upon time.

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) has significantly increased its focus on employers’ compensation systems during scheduled affirmative action compliance audits.  In fiscal year 2011, OFCCP had 27 compliance evaluations with pay provisions for alleged compensation disparities, totaling $1.06 million in monetary benefits.  In 2010, OFCCP reached 10 settlements for alleged bias in compensation.  These are significant increases from 2009 and 2008; only two findings of alleged compensation discrimination were found in 2009 and zero in 2008.

Under Executive Order 11246, Federal contractors are required to conduct self-audits of their pay systems to identify potential gender or race based disparities.  If pay disparities are found, contractors are expected to correct the disparities prior to any potential government audit.  In light of the OFCCP’s increased scrutiny of compensation systems, contractors need to protect themselves by collecting and storing detailed data on factors affecting employees’ pay, such as years of prior job experience, time at the company, time in the position, education, performance ratings, pay grade or level, and additional compensation (commissions, bonuses, incentives, overtime, etc.).  Federal contractors should also be sure to preserve all salary records for employees, to allow for the creation of a salary history for individual employees.  In addition, contractors should have written compensation guidelines, as well as defined polices influencing compensation, such as the impact of performance evaluations on compensation.

It is expected that OFCCP’s heightened focus on compensation will continue to grow. To avoid significant back pay awards based on perceived pay disparities due to race or gender, employers must be proactive in self-auditing their compensation practices and making appropriate adjustments prior to any government review.

On September 26, 2012, the Second Department Appellate Division held that an employer who hires undocumented aliens in violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") is still shielded by the Workers' Compensation Law if those employees are injured on the job.

IRCA was adopted by Congress in an attempt to curtail illegal immigration.  Toward that end, it imposed a duty upon employers to verify a prospective employee's identity and work eligibility by examining the individual's documentation prior to hiring.  Absent the requisite documentation, employment cannot be offered.  Employers who violate IRCA are subject to civil and criminal penalties.

The Workers' Compensation Law insulates employers from personal injury claims brought by their employees, and also precludes third party claims against the employer for contribution and indemnification except in instances of “grave injury” or where the employer contracted to provide such indemnification.

How do these federal and state provisions relate?  In a matter of first impression, the Second Department Appellate Division was asked to decide whether the protection afforded employers under the Workers' Compensation Law was still available in the event that the employer violated IRCA.  Yes, it was, according to the decision in New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens v. Microtech Construction Corp.

In arriving at that conclusion, the Court made several observations.  First, it noted that in adopting IRCA, Congress expressly preempted all state and local laws that imposed civil or criminal sanctions upon employers for similar offenses.  It also observed that the statute was silent as to any further preemptive effect.  Indeed, to the contrary, IRCA’s legislative history demonstrated a lack of intent to diminish existing labor protections.  Consistent with that conclusion, the Court determined that there could be no express preemption of the Workers' Compensation Law, as none of its relevant provisions seek to impose civil or criminal sanctions for employing undocumented aliens.

While the Court acknowledged that stripping away the protections of the Workers' Compensation Law from an IRCA-violating employer may support the federal statute’s ultimate goals, it held nevertheless that retaining such protections despite an IRCA violation did not present such an obstacle to attaining Congress’ objectives that the Workers' Compensation Law could be considered preempted.  Thus, the Court ruled that an IRCA violation did not serve to diminish or remove the protections afforded an employer under the Workers' Compensation Law.

On September 28, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board handed down its first decision regarding whether an employee’s termination in connection with his postings on Facebook was unlawful.  In its decision, however, the Board dodged the more thorny aspect of the case, which was whether other Facebook postings of the employee that were openly critical of the employer were protected under the Act.

The Board concluded that the employee, a salesman at a BMW dealership, was terminated for posting pictures on Facebook of an unfortunate incident at an adjoining Land Rover dealership, which was also owned by the same employer.  The incident depicted in the employee’s photos was of a Land Rover that had been driven into a pond by a customer’s teenage son and included the caption:  “This is your car.  This is your car on drugs.”  He also wrote on his Facebook page:

This is what happens when a sales Person sitting in the front passenger seat (Former Sales Person, actually) allows a 13 year old boy to get behind the wheel of a 6000 lb. truck built and designed to pretty much drive over anything.  The kid drives over his father’s foot and into the pond in all about 4 seconds and destroys a $50,000 truck.  OOOPS!

The Board, affirming the ALJ, concluded that there was nothing protected or concerted about these posts by the employee because they did not concern any terms or conditions of employment and they were posted solely by the employee, apparently as a “lark.”

The Board did not consider whether more controversial postings by the employee on his Facebook page were protected, concerted activity under the Act.  Those postings were critical of the employer’s “Ultimate Driving Event” at the BMW dealership.  Specifically, the employee criticized the low budget food and drink offerings provided to customers -- the 8 oz. bag of chips, the $2.00 cookie plate from Sam’s Club and the hot dog cart where a customer “could attain a over cooked wiener and a stale bunn [sic],” among other criticisms.  Because the Board agreed with the ALJ that the employee had been fired exclusively for the Land Rover postings, which were clearly unprotected, the Board found it unnecessary to determine whether the employee’s other postings were protected.

However, two members of the Board (with Member Hayes dissenting) concluded that the following policy of the employer was unlawful:

Courtesy:  Courtesy is the responsibility of every employee.  Everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees.  No one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.

Specifically, the Board found the broad prohibitions of the rule on “disrespectful” conduct and use of “language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership” implicated protected Section 7 activities, including complaining about working conditions and seeking the support of others in improving them.  The Board noted that there was nothing else in the rule -- or the employee handbook generally -- to suggest that conduct protected by Section 7 of the Act is excluded from the Courtesy rule.  The two-member majority rejected the argument advanced by dissenting member Hayes that the words contained in the rule must not be read “in isolation,” and that the first two sentences inform employees that the rule is intended simply to promote civility in the workplace.

Just two weeks after the National Labor Relations Board’s first decision regarding the lawfulness of an employer’s social media policy, another employer received an adverse decision on its social media policy, this time by a Board administrative law judge.  On September 20, 2012, ALJ Clifford Anderson ruled that EchoStar Technologies’ social media policy chilled employees’ Section 7 rights and thus violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.

The challenged portions of the policy (i) prohibited employees from “mak[ing] disparaging or defamatory comments about EchoStar, its employees, officers, directors, vendors, customers, partners, affiliates, or our or their products/services”; and (ii) further prohibited employees’ participation in personal social media activities “with EchoStar resources and/or on Company time” without company authorization.

Applying the test set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the judge preliminarily found that the EchoStar policy did not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity and noted the absence of a claim that the policy was promulgated in response to union activity or that it had been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.  He found, however, that the term “disparaging” was impermissibly overbroad and would be read by a reasonable employee to intrude on and chill the employee’s right to engage in activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.

ALJ Anderson further rejected EchoStar’s argument that a “savings clause” salvaged the rule.  The clause advised employees to contact Human Resources if they had questions regarding the handbook and further stated that if a conflict arose between an EchoStar policy and the law, the appropriate law would govern and the policy would be conformed in accordance with that law.  Noting that the clause appeared in the introductory sections of the handbook, several pages before the social media policy, the ALJ found that a general admonition to contact Human Resources does not create a “legal loop” that an employee must jump through before the rule may be challenged.  He further found that a boilerplate clause that a document’s provisions be applied and interpreted in a legally permissible manner does not save an otherwise invalid rule under the Act.  Without any analysis, the ALJ also found that the rule prohibiting employees from using personal social media with company resources and/or on company time also violated the Act.

Additionally, ALJ Anderson invalidated several other handbook policies (or portions thereof), including policies regarding “contact with the media” and “contact with government agencies," the “investigations” policy insofar as it required that employees “maintain confidentiality” during internal company investigations, and the portion of the “disciplinary actions” policy defining “insubordination” to include “undermining the Company, management or employees.”  In each instance, the ALJ found the challenged language to be overbroad and likely to induce a reasonable employee to conclude that it encompassed, and thereby prohibited, protected Section 7 activity.

Similar to the Board in Costco, ALJ Anderson appears to have closely tracked the reasoning of Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon, as set forth in Mr. Solomon's three Operations Memos issued during the past 14 months.  That said, the Board’s analysis of social media policies remains in its infancy and little specific guidance on permissible policy language is currently available.  Until further decisions and guidance are issued, employers should continue to consult with counsel in crafting their social media policies, with an eye toward (i) avoiding broad, vague prohibitions; (ii) including specific examples of prohibited conduct; and (iii) inserting appropriate disclaimers within the policy itself.

On September 7, the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) issued its first decision on the lawfulness of an employer’s social media policy under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  We have previously reported on three non-binding reports issued by the Board’s Acting General Counsel (“GC”) since August 2011, outlining his views of impermissibly restrictive social media rules.  In Costco Wholesale Corp., the Board has indicated that it may take an approach similar to the GC in scrutinizing employer efforts to control employees’ online speech.

The Costco policy prohibited employees from electronically posting communications that “damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation, or violate the policies outlined in the Costco Employee Agreement.”  Reversing the administrative law judge’s ruling, a three-member Board panel held that this rule was overly broad in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  In reaching this conclusion, the Board found that the wording of the policy “clearly encompasse[d] concerted communications” protesting Costco’s treatment of its employees.  The Board further found that in the absence of any accompanying language that “even arguably suggests that protected communications are excluded from the broad parameters of the rule,” employees would reasonably assume the policy prohibited them from engaging in communications critical of Costco or its agents.  Costco was ordered to rescind the policy insofar as it prohibited employees from making on-line statements damaging to the company’s or any person’s reputation.

Costco’s policy also provided that “sensitive information such as . . . payroll . . . information may not be shared, transmitted or stored for personal or public use without prior management approval.”  The provision was deemed unlawful, because the Board determined that employees would reasonably conclude that it prohibited them from discussing their wages and other terms and conditions of employment.  Costco’s argument that the rule should be read to prohibit only the sharing of the “confidential business component of payroll, such as budgeted payroll and expenses and the like” was rejected.  Although the rule also prohibited disclosure of items unrelated to terms and conditions of employment, such as social security and credit card numbers, when read in the context of the entire document, the Board believed that term “payroll information” would reasonably be construed by employees to prohibit protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, such as discussing their compensation.

However, that portion of the Costco policy that required employees to use “appropriate business decorum” in communications with others was found to be lawful.  The administrative law judge (affirmed by the Board) agreed that an employer may lawfully establish rules providing for a civil workplace.  The GC’s contention, that the rule could be interpreted by employees as restricting Section 7 activities, was rejected.  Rather, the Board held that the applicable legal standard is whether the rule in question would be construed by employees to restrict Section 7 activity.

Additional cases involving social media issues are likely to be decided by the Board over the next several months.  Until further decisions and guidance are issued, employers should consult with legal counsel in crafting their policies.  Employers would also be well-advised to avoid broad, vague restrictions (e.g., “non-disparagement”) and restrictions that plainly impinge on protected speech (e.g, “no discussion of wages”).  Employers should also include specific examples of prohibited conduct and a “savings clause” or other disclaimer language making clear that the policy is not intended to restrict Section 7 rights.