NLRB Holds That Discharge of Employees for Facebook Conversation Was Unlawful
September 10, 2014
New York Labor and Employment Law Report
September 10, 2014
August 20, 2014
To decide whether the threshold has been reached, courts examine the case-specific circumstances in their totality and evaluate the severity, frequency, and degree of the abuse. . . . Facially sex-neutral incidents may be included . . . among the “totality of the circumstances” that courts consider in any hostile work environment claim, so long as a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they were, in fact, based on sex.The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of Ms. Moll’s hostile work environment claim because the District Court did not consider whether the sex-neutral conduct alleged by Ms. Moll occurred within the applicable statute of limitations period. The Moll decision serves as a good reminder of what must be considered by employers faced with an internal complaint from an employee that he/she is experiencing a sexually hostile work environment. Even if the sexually explicit statements and sexually offensive conduct about which the employee complains occurred in the distant past, the employer must still review the totality of the circumstances, including all facially sex-neutral statements and conduct alleged by the employee, to determine whether a sexually hostile work environment exists. If so, the employer must act promptly and decisively to remedy the situation, or else face potential liability.
August 14, 2014
August 13, 2014
August 5, 2014
On July 15, 2014, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued a policy memorandum to its Regional Administrators, explaining in greater detail the agency’s Temporary Worker Initiative ("TWI"). The TWI, which was launched on April 29, 2013, is an initiative intended to prevent work-related injuries and illnesses among temporary workers. Employers who have temporary employees hired through staffing agencies should be aware that OSHA has a particular focus on the health and safety of those temporary employees, and should ensure that those temporary employees are provided with proper protective equipment and training to minimize any potential workplace hazards. Perhaps the most interesting portion of the memorandum is the agency’s explanation that “in general, OSHA will consider the staffing agency and host employer to be ‘joint employers’ of the workers in this situation” and, thus, that both employers will be responsible for protecting the safety and health of the worker. OSHA noted that these “obligations will sometimes overlap” and that -- depending on the circumstances of any violations of the Act -- the agency will “consider issuing citations to either or both of the employers.” Notably, while the memorandum states that a host employer will normally have “primary responsibility for determining the hazards in their workplace and complying with worksite-specific requirements,” it adds that the temporary agency or staffing firm also has a “duty to diligently inquire and determine what, if any, safety and health hazards are present at their client’s workplaces.” The memorandum includes the following example: “If a staffing agency is supplying workers to a host where they will be working in a manufacturing setting using potentially hazardous equipment, the agency should take reasonable steps to identify any hazards present, to ensure that workers will receive the required training, protective equipment, and other safeguards, and then later verify that the protections are in place." The memorandum indicates that additional bulletins and a compliance directive regarding the TWI will be issued.
August 4, 2014
July 23, 2014
July 22, 2014
On July 22, 2014, Governor Cuomo signed a bill that amends the New York Human Rights Law by adding a new Section 296-c entitled, “Unlawful discriminatory practices relating to interns.” The amendment prohibits employers from discriminating against unpaid interns and prospective interns on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, with respect to hiring, discharge, and other terms and conditions of employment. The amendment further prohibits employers from retaliating against unpaid interns who oppose practices forbidden under the Human Rights Law or who file a complaint, testify, or assist in a proceeding brought under the Human Rights Law. The amendment also makes it unlawful for employers to compel an intern who is pregnant to take a leave of absence, unless the pregnancy prevents the intern from performing the functions of the internship in a reasonable manner. The amendment also prohibits employers from subjecting interns to sexual harassment or any other type of harassment based on a protected category. This legislation was introduced following a 2013 case in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a sexual harassment claim asserted by an unpaid intern who alleged that her boss had groped her and tried to kiss her. In that decision, the Court was bound by the language of the statute that existed at that time and the court decisions interpreting that language, which provided that the Human Rights Law only applied to paid employees and did not apply to unpaid interns. The purpose of the legislation is to give unpaid interns the same right to be free from workplace discrimination and harassment as paid employees. Employers who have unpaid interns or expect to have unpaid interns in the future should consider revising their anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies to explicitly provide that discrimination and harassment against interns will not be tolerated, and that complaints made by interns regarding alleged unlawful harassment will be investigated in the same manner as complaints made by employees. In addition, as we noted in a 2010 blog post, employers should also make sure that unpaid interns truly qualify as unpaid interns, and would not be considered "employees" who are entitled to the minimum wage and overtime protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York wage and hour laws.
July 21, 2014
July 21, 2014
Employment at [the Employer] is on an at-will basis unless otherwise stated in a written individual employment agreement signed by the [Senior Vice President of] Human Resources. This means that employment may be terminated by the employee or [the Employer] at any time, for any reason or for no reason, and with or without prior notice. No one has the authority to make any express or implied representations in connection with, or in any way limit, an employee’s right to resign or [the Employer’s] right to terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or for no reason, with or without prior notice. Nothing in this handbook creates an employment agreement, express or implied, or any other agreement between any employee and [the Employer]. No statement, act, series of events or pattern of conduct can change this at-will relationship.(Brackets in original). In finding the above provision to be lawful, the GC’s Office reasoned:
June 30, 2014
On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., that a for-profit corporation is a “person” that has religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). Therefore, guidance under the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") that requires all 20 FDA-approved contraceptive measures to be covered with no employee cost sharing as a part of women’s “preventive services” does not apply to closely-held businesses where this mandate interferes with the ability to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs. The Court determined that the $100 per day, per person, penalty that applies under the ACA for failure to satisfy the contraceptive mandate was a “substantial burden” on those corporations. That burden could not be relieved by dropping health coverage and paying the (also substantial) $2,000 per employee annual penalty that would apply if even one employee got subsidized coverage on a state or federal exchange, according to the Court. The Court had difficulty reconciling ACA regulations that provide employees of nonprofit religious corporations access to contraceptives by requiring that insurers provide a contraceptive rider at no cost to the employer or employees. This, the Court noted, provides a path to satisfying the government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the challenged contraceptive methods. However, the economies of this measure (saving the insurance companies the cost of undesired pregnancies) does not translate to self-funded health plans where the third-party administrator obtains no cost savings. Third party administrators have no economic interest in the performance of self-funded plans, because all claims are paid from the general assets of employers, or from trusts. In New York, the Hobby Lobby decision would apply only to self-funded plans. New York Insurance Law Sections 3221(l)(16) and 4330(cc)(1) require health insurance contracts to include a rider covering all FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices. The exception for “religious employers” is both narrow and specific, requiring that all of the following conditions be met:
One day after issuing its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court issued orders in six other cases that were decided by various federal appellate courts relating to religious objections to covering contraceptive measures in employee health plans. Those orders signify that the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby may not necessarily be limited to the four methods of contraception that were challenged in that case (two “morning-after” type drugs and two intrauterine devices), and may extend to all 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods. It remains to be seen how employees in a self-funded health plan maintained by a religious employer can obtain contraceptive coverage without cost, as the Supreme Court suggests. Undoubtedly, the Obama Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services are puzzling over changes to the ACA guidance to achieve this goal without violating the RFRA.
June 26, 2014
On June 26, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that President Obama's recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") on January 4, 2012, were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning means that the NLRB did not have a valid quorum of three members from the date of the recess appointments to early August of 2013, when four new members were sworn in after being confirmed by the Senate. Every decision issued by the NLRB during that approximately 19-month time period without a valid quorum has been rendered invalid by the Supreme Court's Noel Canning decision. It remains to be seen how the NLRB will deal with this development, but it may now have to reconsider and issue new decisions in each and every case that was decided without a valid quorum in place. However, in light of the fact that the majority of the NLRB members is still staunchly pro-union, it would be unrealistic to expect significantly different outcomes in cases that were decided against employers. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that President Obama exceeded his authority under the Recess Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause. The Recess Appointments Clause permits the President to "fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." The D.C. Circuit held that the phrase "the Recess of the Senate" applies only to recesses that occur in between sessions of the Senate -- not to breaks in activity that occur during a session of the Senate. The January 4, 2012, recess appointments were not made during a recess that occurred in between sessions of the Senate. The D.C. Circuit also interpreted the phrase "Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate" to mean that the vacancy actually must arise during the Senate's inter-session recess in order for the President to have the authority to fill the vacancy without going through the Senate confirmation process. None of the three vacancies that President Obama sought to fill on January 4, 2012 arose during the Senate's inter-session recess. The Supreme Court adopted a broader interpretation of the scope of the President's authority under the Recess Appointments Clause. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "the Recess of the Senate" applies both to inter-session recesses (breaks that occur between sessions of the Senate) and intra-session recesses (breaks that occur in the midst of a formal session of the Senate) of substantial length. The Supreme Court also held that the phrase "Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate" applies both to vacancies that first arise during a recess and vacancies that initially occur before a recess but continue to exist during the recess. The Supreme Court nevertheless determined that President Obama's recess appointments during a three-day intra-session recess of the Senate were unconstitutional because the three-day recess was not of substantial length. The Supreme Court held that a recess of less than ten days is presumptively too short to permit the President to make recess appointments, but left open the possibility that unusual circumstances might require the President to exercise recess appointment authority during a recess of less than ten days. Some of the NLRB decisions that have now been rendered invalid include: (1) the NLRB's September of 2012 holding in Costco Wholesale Corp. that an employer's social media policy was overly broad and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"); (2) the NLRB's December of 2012 holding (and reversal of 50 years of precedent) in WKYC-TV, Inc. that an employer's obligation to check off union dues continues after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement; (3) the NLRB's December of 2012 holding (and reversal of 35 years of precedent) in American Baptist Homes of the West d/b/a Piedmont Gardens that witness statements related to employee discipline are not necessarily shielded from disclosure to the union; and (4) the NLRB's July of 2012 holding in Banner Health System that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by asking employees not to discuss ongoing investigations with their co-workers. Although these decisions and many others will likely be revisited, it seems unlikely that the NLRB will issue significantly different rulings. Accordingly, employers should assume at this point that the invalid decisions will be affirmed by the current NLRB.