New York Hospitality Industry Wage Board Recommends Increase in Tipped Employee Minimum Wage
February 4, 2015
New York Labor and Employment Law Report
February 4, 2015
January 21, 2015
In a victory for Home Care employers, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued consecutive decisions which struck down two regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (“USDOL”) that would have eviscerated the “companionship exemption” contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The two USDOL regulations enacted in late 2013 were prevented from taking effect, as scheduled, on January 1, 2015, by two related decisions on December 22, 2014 and January 14, 2015, which vacated both regulations on the ground that they “conflicted with the [FLSA] statute itself.” Each of the two challenged regulations would have imposed greater overtime obligations on Home Care employers, by sharply reducing the reach of the FLSA “companionship exemption,” which, for 40 years, had excluded most Home Care work from federal overtime laws. Specifically, the exemption excludes from federal minimum wage and overtime obligations companionship and live-in “services which provide fellowship, care and protection to a person who, because of advanced age or physical or mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs,” unless the work is performed by a Registered Nurse or similarly trained professional. In the first of the two decisions, the District Court struck down a USDOL regulation that would have eliminated the companionship exemption unless the Home Care worker is employed directly by the patient or household itself, rather than by an Agency. Since the vast majority of Home Care workers are employed by Home Care Agencies, this new regulation would have had sweeping impact, had it taken effect. In striking down the regulation, the Court held that “Congress intended the exemption to apply to all employers who provide companionship and live-in domestic services. . . .” It curtly rejected the new regulation as contrary to the statute, noting that “Congress surely did not delegate to the [USDOL] here the authority to issue a regulation that transforms defining statutory terms . . . based on who cuts a check, rather than what work is being performed.” Shortly thereafter, on January 14, 2015, the Court addressed a second USDOL regulation which redefined – and significantly narrowed – the type of work that would be covered under the companionship exemption, restricting it to only those companions who provide “care” or assist with “activities of daily living” during less than 20% of their total hours. Since Home Care is routinely intended to provide significant assistance with activities of daily living (such as driving, meal preparation, dressing, feeding and bathing), this regulation virtually eliminated the companionship exemption. The Court rejected the regulation on the ground that it contradicts the FLSA itself. The statutory exemption refers to “care” and services for the elderly and disabled “who are unable to care for themselves.” The Court determined that the USDOL regulation would “write out of the exemption the very ‘care’ the elderly and disabled need . . . .” In a closing flourish, the Court scolded the USDOL for usurping Congressional authority:
Redefining a 40-year-old exemption out of existence may be satisfyingly efficient to the Department of Labor, but it strikes at the heart of the balance of power our Founding Fathers intended to rest in the hands of those who must face the electorate on a regular basis.
Taken together, the two decisions wholly restore the previously-existing companionship and live-in exemptions from federal minimum wage and overtime laws. An appeal to a higher federal court may well follow, so the two decisions may not be the final word on the USDOL Regulations. It remains prudent to continue to follow this issue closely for further development, and to consult counsel if needed. In addition, Home Care Agencies in New York should take note that, even in the absence of the applicability of federal minimum wage and overtime laws, New York law requires that home care employees be paid a minimum wage of $8.75 per hour, and requires that hours over 40 in a work week be paid at 1½ times the State minimum wage (i.e., $13.125 per hour) rather than 1½ times the employee’s regular rate.
December 30, 2014
December 19, 2014
December 18, 2014
December 5, 2014
November 12, 2014
November 11, 2014
With that first real chill in the air, the holiday season is suddenly upon us. For parents, it is a time to relive our childhood, watching with our children all of those holiday specials ranging from It's the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown to Santa Claus is Comin' to Town. Unfortunately, for members of our misfit profession, “tis the season” is not so much about being jolly, but more about defending lawsuits. And speaking of lawsuits, a daily perusal of employment law blogs and periodicals reveals that there is no shortage of new and innovative ways to sue an employer. The seemingly endless tide of profligate litigation makes me shiver like Linus in the Pumpkin Patch about what would happen if the Department of Labor, the EEOC, or the plaintiff’s bar set its sights on Santa and his manufacturing plant in the North Pole. For this reason, I offer the following guidance to Mr. Kringle d/b/a Santa on how to clean up some glaring employment law violations. (Disclaimer: Our guidance to Mr. Kringle is not intended to be legal advice nor should it be a substitute for him retaining local counsel familiar with the laws in his local jurisdiction. I would also include the obligatory tax advice disclaimer, but I believe Mr. Kringle is tax-exempt.) I will discuss individual lawsuits below. However, my main concern in terms of liability is in the arena of the class action. I say this with all due love and affection, “Mr. Kringle, your workshop is a treasure-trove of wage and hour violations.” The elves work, quite obviously, more than 40 hours a week. They work through meal periods and weekends and holidays. Where is their overtime pay? While efficiently furnished, I don’t see any punch clock for your employees. Can we say liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees? Your workplace is also quite literally an accident waiting to happen. The elves have no protective equipment. There is an Abominable Snowman on the shop floor. Can we all say, “OSHA”? Mr. Kringle, despite your big heart, your workplace is rife with harassment and discrimination. For example, there is Rudolph’s red nose and the universally known harassment and bullying to which he has been subjected (“used to laugh and call him names”). The un-remedied mocking of Rudolph makes for a great holiday gift for the plaintiff’s lawyer who signs up Rudolph and his “slam dunk” suit. (We make no representations as to whether any plaintiffs-side lawyers are on the "Nice List" and worthy of such a gift). I think it is imperative that all of your reindeer immediately receive anti-harassment training. So too with poor Hermey. The Seinfeldesque “Anti-Dentite” environment that you have condoned is ripe for litigation and is otherwise an insult to dentists world-wide. That leads us to our Faragher defenses. Are your EEO policies translated into “Elfish” and properly distributed with a clear record of same? Of additional concern, have you taken care to make sure that the post-toy delivery workplace celebration does not cross the proverbial “line” of appropriateness and result in more than just hangovers at the workshop the next day? Finally, we need a word about the Island of Misfit Toys. Notwithstanding that the public may want all lawyers permanently deposited in this desolate place, it is nonetheless illegal to segregate your workforce on the basis of such protected characteristics as being a cowboy who rides an ostrich. And, who among us wouldn’t want to ride an ostrich? Of course, Mr. Kringle is not the only one staring down the barrel at punitive damages. Yes, I’m talking to you, Mr. Burgermeister Meisterburger. Making toys is plainly a recreational activity under state labor laws and interfering with concerted activity in this regard will get you an unfriendly knock on the door from the NLRB. So, to our clients and blog subscribers, I wish you all a joyous holiday season in front of a warm fire surrounded by friends and family, without any visions of EEOC complaints or Department of Labor audits dancing in your heads.
June 20, 2014
March 17, 2014
February 13, 2014
On February 12, 2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order requiring that all new federal contracts and subcontracts contain a clause specifying that the minimum wage to be paid to workers under those federal contracts and subcontracts must be at least $10.10 per hour beginning January 1, 2015. The federal contracts and subcontracts covered by this Executive Order include procurement contracts for services or construction and contracts for concessions. This new $10.10 minimum wage will also apply to disabled employees who are currently working under a special certificate issued by the Secretary of Labor permitting payment of less than the minimum wage. Beginning January 1, 2016, and annually thereafter, the minimum wage for federal contractors will be increased by the Secretary of Labor based on the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, and rounded to the nearest multiple of five cents. The Secretary of Labor is required to publish the new minimum wage at least 90 days before the new minimum wage is scheduled to take effect. For tipped employees, the hourly cash wage that must be paid by a federal contractor must be at least $4.90 beginning on January 1, 2015. In each subsequent year, the federal contractor minimum wage for tipped employees will be increased by 95 cents until it equals 70 percent of the federal contractor minimum wage in effect for non-tipped employees. If an employee’s tips, when added to the hourly wage, do not add up to the federal contractor minimum wage for non-tipped employees, the federal contractor will be required to supplement the employee's hourly wage to make up the difference. The Secretary of Labor is expected to issue regulations by October 1, 2014, to implement the provisions of the Executive Order.
January 27, 2014
On January 27, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision clarifying the meaning of "changing clothes" under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). In Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., the Supreme Court adopted a fairly broad definition of the phrase "changing clothes," which should provide employers with some comfort that provisions of a collective bargaining agreement excluding clothes-changing time from compensable hours worked will likely be applied to time spent by employees donning and doffing most forms of protective gear. In general, the FLSA requires employers to pay employees for time spent donning and doffing protective clothing and equipment, if the employer requires employees to wear such protective clothing and equipment, and if the employee must change into and out of the protective clothing and equipment at the work site. However, Section 203(o) of the FLSA provides that such time is not compensable if the employer and the representative of the employer's employees have agreed to a provision in their collective bargaining agreement to exclude from hours worked "time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday." In Sandifer, a group of U.S. Steel employees contended that even though their collective bargaining agreement excluded time spent "changing clothes" from compensable work time, they should nevertheless be compensated for such time because many of the items they were required to wear were protective in nature. The employees argued that the items they were required to wear should not be considered "clothes" under the FLSA because those items are intended to protect against workplace hazards. The employees also argued that, by putting on those protective items over their own clothes (rather than substituting those protective items for their own clothes), they were not engaged in "changing" clothes under the FLSA. The Supreme Court refused to interpret the phrase "changing clothes" as narrowly as the employees urged. With respect to the definition of "clothes," the Supreme Court examined the dictionary definition of the term that existed at the time Section 203(o) of the FLSA was enacted, and held that the term includes all items that are designed to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress. The Supreme Court further held that the definition of "clothes" does not necessarily exclude items that are worn exclusively for protection, as long as those items are designed to cover the body and are regarded as articles of dress. With respect to the definition of "changing," the Supreme Court again examined the dictionary definition of the term that existed at the time Section 203(o) was enacted, and held that the term can mean either substituting or altering. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that time spent by employees altering their garments by putting on and taking off articles of dress constituted "changing clothes" under the FLSA, and that the employees were not entitled to compensation for such time based on the exclusion set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. Applying these definitions, the Supreme Court considered 12 items of protective gear: a flame-retardant jacket, a pair of pants, and a hood; a hardhat; a snood (which is a hood that covers the neck and upper shoulder area); wristlets; work gloves; leggings; metatarsal boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator. The Supreme Court found that the first nine items qualified as "clothes," but the last three did not. Thus, the Supreme Court was left to consider the question of whether courts should tally the minutes spent donning and doffing each item, in order to deduct the time spent donning and doffing the non-clothing items from non-compensable time. Recognizing that "it is most unlikely Congress meant Section 203(o) to convert federal judges into time-study professionals," the Supreme Court stated that courts should analyze whether the time period at issue can, on the whole, be characterized as "time spent in changing clothes or washing." The Supreme Court articulated a "vast majority" standard for courts to use in their analysis:
If an employee devotes the vast majority of the time in question to putting on and off equipment or other non-clothes items (perhaps a diver's suit and tank) the entire period would not qualify as 'time spent in changing clothes' under Section 203(o), even if some clothes items were donned and doffed as well. But if the vast majority of the time is spent in donning and doffing 'clothes' as we have defined that term, the entire period qualifies, and the time spent putting on and off other items need not be subtracted.
The Supreme Court concluded that the employees of U.S. Steel spent a vast majority of the time in question donning and doffing items that fell within the definition of "clothes," and that their time was non-compensable under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Although courts addressing this issue in the future will be bound by the broad definition of the phrase "changing clothes" set forth in the Supreme Court's Sandifer decision, courts will be left to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether employees spend a "vast majority" of the time in question donning and doffing items that qualify as clothes or non-clothes items.