In a number of cases since Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, the Supreme Court has upheld in a variety of contexts the use of some degree of race based preferences in the admissions process for colleges and universities.  Although not its most recent decisions in this area, two of its most discussed decisions came out of Michigan.  In one, Gratz v. Bollinger the Supreme Court in 2003 found that the undergraduate admissions process at the University of Michigan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by its use of race based preferences.  At the same time, it also held, in Grutter v. Bollinger, that the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race based preferences was permissible. Following these decisions, Michigan voters adopted Proposal 2, which became Article I, Section 26 of the State Constitution.  As relevant, it provides:

The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. (Emphasis added.)

 This Proposal was challenged in two cases.  The District Court initially found that it was permissible for the voters of Michigan to adopt this constitutional amendment.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an original 2-1 decision and a subsequent 8-7 en banc decision, held that the Proposal was unconstitutional.  Today, in a 6-2 decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the U. S. Supreme Court has upheld the State’s adoption of this amendment.  The plurality opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, and joined in by Chief Justice Roberts (who also issued a concurrence) and Justice Alito.  Justice Scalia issued a concurrence which was joined by Justice Thomas.  Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent, joined in by Justice Ginsburg.  Justice Kagan did not participate in the Court’s decision. As Justice Kennedy noted at the outset of the Court’s decision:

Before the Court addresses the question presented, it is important to note what this case is not about.  It is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education. … In Fisher [v. University of Texas at Austin], the Court did not disturb the principle that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met.  In this case, as in Fisher, that principle is not challenged.  The question here concerns not the permissibility of race-conscious admissions policies under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental decision, in particular with respect to school admissions.

The plurality opinion essentially concludes that notwithstanding prior Court precedent (creating the “political-process" doctrine) which recognized that voter action which effectively “insinuate[d] the State into [a] decision to discriminate by encouraging that practice,” in a way that “was designed to be used, or was likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race,” could be unconstitutional, that was not the case here.  Justice Kennedy closed his opinion by noting that “[t]his is not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved.  It is about who may resolve it.  There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to the voters.” Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, would overrule the Court’s precedent establishing the political process doctrine, rather than distinguish it away as the plurality did.  Justice Scalia also noted that he was parting company with the plurality because he found that their view at least left “ ajar an effects-test escape hatch” that might permit the finding of an Equal Protection Clause violation in the absence of discriminatory intent, based on disparate impact, which he argues has no place in the Court’s jurisprudence. For Justice Sotomayor, Proposal 2 fell squarely within the political-process doctrine:  “When the majority reconfigures the political process in a manner that burdens only a racial minority, that alteration triggers strict judicial scrutiny.”  As she noted in closing:

The Constitution does not protect racial minorities form political defeat.  But neither does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers against racial minorities.  The political-process doctrine polices the channels of change to ensure that the majority, when it wins, does so without rigging the rules of the game to ensure its success.  Today, the Court discards that doctrine without good reason.

As noted at the outset, this decision does not change the legal landscape with regard to the permissibility, as a matter of federal constitutional law, of race conscious admissions policies in higher education.  And in fact it has little bearing on what may or can happen in the world of private higher education.  It does, however, reaffirm the ability of the electorate to enforce its views at the ballot box on this highly important and charged issue in the realm of public education.

Recent articles and postings not only highlight the continuing focus on sexual assault cases on college campuses by the victims of those assaults, but also on the threat of litigation by those accused of the assaults.  In the past two years, at least half a dozen actions have been brought against institutions by those accused, generally alleging various issues with the handling of their cases.  A recent decision by a federal court in Ohio, in Wells v. Xavier University, illustrates institutions’ potential liability to the accused. In this case, a student athlete at Xavier was accused, falsely he claimed, by another student of a sexual assault.  The University’s Conduct Board found the student responsible for a “serious violation” of the Code of Student Conduct.  At some point, the University apparently issued a statement, naming the student, and indicating that he was “found….responsible for a serious violation of the Code of Student Conduct” and that he was expelled from the University. The expelled student brought an action against the University raising a number of claims.  Among other things, he asserted that he did not in fact commit a violation of the Code of Student Conduct, serious or otherwise (he claimed that any sexual encounter was consensual), that it was apparent to the community that the University’s statement was referring to a sexual assault, and that he had therefore been libeled.  In addition, he claimed that his rights under Title IX had been violated by the University’s conduct because it was reacting against him, erroneously, as a male and in response to several OCR investigations critical of how the University had responded to past sexual assault cases involving other students. The University moved to dismiss these two claims, arguing that as a matter of law they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The Court denied this request, allowing both of these counts to proceed.  Specifically, the Court concluded that the University’s statement (in the context of the student’s allegations that the Conduct Board was ill equipped to conduct a hearing on such a serious matter, that outside government authorities (the prosecutor) had questioned the outcome of this internal process, and that press coverage demonstrated damage to the student’s reputation) supported the libel claims.  As the Court noted:

[I]t appears to the Court that the [hearing body], a body well-equipped to adjudicate questions of cheating, may have been in over its head with relation to an alleged false accusation of sexual assault.  Such conclusion is strongly bolstered by the fact that the County Prosecutor allegedly investigated, found nothing, and encouraged [the University’s President] to drop the matter.  Plaintiff’s allegations suggest [the President] did not do so due to Xavier’s mishandling of other cases that were at nearly the same time, subject to investigation by the OCR.

This, the Court concluded, was enough to allow the claim to proceed.  In addition, the Court allowed the Title IX claims to proceed because the plaintiff adequately pled that the University had engaged in a pattern of decision-making that resulted in an alleged false outcome for him, in response to other OCR investigations.  The Court also found that, at this early stage, the allegations were sufficient to support a claim of deliberate indifference by the institution because, he alleged, despite warnings from the prosecutor that the allegations against him were unfounded, the University proceeded with internal hearings “with the goal of demonstrating to the OCR that Xavier was taking assault allegations seriously.” Of course it remains to be seen whether the plaintiff in this case will be able to prove any of these allegations.  But at this stage the only question for the Court was whether, if his allegations were taken as true, they would form a basis for liability, and it answered in the affirmative. This case serves as just one more reminder for institutions of the need to tread very carefully in the context of sexual assault cases.  While they must be mindful of the victims’ rights, and protecting the campus community from further acts of misconduct, they too must be sensitive to the rights of the accused.  Careful review of policies to ensure that they meet the requirements of state and federal law for both the accuser and the accused, training of those charged with applying those policies, and sensitivity to the rights of the individuals charged, are necessities.  Institutions face potential liability from “both sides” and they need to know the proper path to walk.

As reported here last week, the NLRB’s Regional Director in Chicago has determined that those members of the Northwestern University football team who receive grants-in-aid are “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act.  Even aside from the questionable basis for this conclusion, the Regional Director’s decision begs the question what are the possible unintended consequences of this decision?  And there are quite a few, only some of which are mentioned below. Perhaps the first unintended consequence is whether the Board’s determination, if upheld, will actually render these student athletes ineligible to play intercollegiate football.  Under NCAA By-law 12.1.2, only amateurs are eligible for competition under NCAA rules.  Therefore,  student-athletes may not use their athletic skill for pay in any form in the sport in which they compete.  If a student-athlete is receiving compensation for their services, as determined by the Regional Director, is that student-athlete now receiving “pay in any form in [their] sport” and as a result no longer an amateur able to compete?  The irony of course is if that ends up being the NCAA’s interpretation of its by-law, that would of course defeat the very purpose behind unionizing in the first place.  Moreover, this possibility is not dependent upon the student-athletes actually unionizing but rather on the mere fact that they are now “paid” for playing.  It would seem that if bargaining actually resulted and any additional benefits were provided to these student-athletes, the likelihood of a loss of amateur status would be even greater. For any other “employee” being “compensated” for their services, income tax is required to be paid on that compensation.  While the test for an employee under the National Labor Relations Act may not be identical to the test used by the IRS, how far behind can taxation be?  Using the numbers reported in the Regional Director’s decision for the value of the players’ grants-in-aid (as much as $76,000 per year at Northwestern), where is a player, or his family, going to come up with the cash to cover this tax bill? In addition, if an employee for this purpose, do players now become employees for purposes of Workers’ Compensation law, and the exclusivity of relief against their “employer” for injuries incurred “on the job” (which may well be less than beneficial to players)? Just how effective can collective bargaining even be in this circumstance?  Colleges and universities are constrained by NCAA rules in terms of benefits that can be given to student-athletes, so it is hard to imagine how bargaining could result in “more” than what is currently provided student-athletes.  In addition, the impact of Title IX would likely require any benefits provided to, for example, football players to be provided to a comparable number of scholarship student-athletes on women’s teams.  Or more likely, the added cost of so complying with Title IX simply makes it that much less likely that any meaningful benefits would flow from bargaining.  And would there be any institutional incentive to provide benefits to non-scholarship players, who even the Regional Director found were not employees?  What would the impact be of some student athletes on a team having the benefits of collective bargaining and others not? Of course, this ruling is presumably not limited to football teams and players.  How does it impact other sports where perhaps only a minority of team members receive grants in aid (and therefore might be “employees” who can be covered by a collective bargaining agreement), but the majority do not (and therefore are not employees at all)? In fact, this ruling presumably is not even limited to athletics.  At some institutions, members of the marching band receive scholarships in return for the “services” they provide.  Undoubtedly, they too are subject to various rules that constrain when and what they can and cannot do (for example, not schedule classes that conflict with afternoon practices).  Other student activities (e.g., Debate at some institutions) also carry stipends or scholarships and likely subject participating students to certain rules not applicable to others.  Are they all now “employees” eligible to organize?  And given the Board’s willingness to recognize “micro-units,” will these all be separate bargaining units? These are just some of the “unintended consequences” flowing from what appears on any number of levels to be an ill thought out determination, as the NLRB continues to attempt to make itself “relevant” in an era when traditional unionization of American workers remains at or near all-time lows. Of course we may not know the answer to these questions for years to come.  The nature of the NLRB review process in an organizing context makes it likely that this issue will not come before the courts, where it is most likely to be resolved, for many years to come.

In a stunning and potential landmark decision, a Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board has found that football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships from Northwestern University (the University) are “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act.  In his decision released Wednesday afternoon, the Regional Director determined that “players receiving scholarships to perform football-related services for [the University] under a contract for hire in return for compensation are subject to [the University]’s control and are therefore employees within the meaning of the Act.”  Accordingly, the Regional Director ordered that an election be conducted among all football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships who have not exhausted their playing eligibility for the University. In support of his decision, the Regional Director found that the players receive compensation for the athletic services they perform in the form of scholarships, which pay for the players’ tuition, fees, room, board, and books and can total as much as $76,000 per calendar year for up to five years.  Furthermore, the Regional Director found that the players are under the strict control of the University throughout the year.  The coaches determine the location, duration, and manner in which the players carry out their football-related activities; they monitor the players’ adherence to NCAA and team rules; and they control “nearly every aspect of the players’ private lives,” including their living arrangements, applications for outside employment, off-campus travel, social media posts, and communications with the media.  In contrast, the Regional Director held that “walk-ons do not meet the definition of ‘employee’ for the fundamental reason that they do not receive compensation for the athletic services that they perform.” The University has confirmed that it plans to appeal the decision to the full National Labor Relations Board in Washington, D.C.   If upheld, the decision has the potential to dramatically alter the world of big-time athletics in higher education as it would open the door for scholarship athletes at all private universities to unionize.  Indeed, the decision could have implications for scholarship students in a number of areas beyond athletics. The Union, College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), which has the financial backing of the United Steelworkers, is seeking, among other demands, financial coverage for former players with sports-related medical expenses and the creation of an educational trust fund to help former players graduate.

Many institutions of higher education, like employers in many industries, use background checks as an integral part of their hiring process.  A recently filed class action lawsuit serves as a reminder to institutions of the importance of strict compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The FCRA limits the purposes for which a background check (including a credit check or criminal background check) can be obtained.  One of the permissible purposes is for employment, including hiring decisions.  However, the Act imposes strict requirements in order to lawfully obtain and use a report.  One of those requirements is that the employer must provide applicants with a stand-alone disclosure and authorization form prior to obtaining a background check.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).  This form must be separate from the employment application, and cannot include any type of language attempting to release the institution from liability associated with obtaining the background check.  Unfortunately, many institutions still fail to comply with this law by relying solely on a disclosure located on employment application to inform applicants that they will be subject to a background check, or by attempting to include additional language on the disclosure. This particular requirement is the focus of a recent class action lawsuit filed against Whole Foods Market California.  Whole Foods is accused of using a legally invalid form to obtain consent to conduct backgrounds checks during their employment application process.  In this case, it is alleged that the employer relied on a background check consent that was included alongside several other consent paragraphs on an online employment application.  Additionally, that consent included a release of claims related to obtaining the background check.  If the employer is found to have used an invalid form the consequences are significant, including invalidation of the consent, statutory damages in the amount of up to $1,000 for each applicant, costs and attorneys’ fees and, potentially, punitive damages. This lawsuit is a reminder that FCRA compliance makes good business sense, and that institutions should periodically review their application and hiring forms and processes to ensure strict compliance.

After what seemed like a small lull in NLRB activity impacting Higher Education, the National Labor Relations Board has once again signaled potentially significant alterations to the legal landscape. Just last week, the NLRB issued an “invitation” to file briefs in a case involving Pacific Lutheran University.  This specific case involves the interplay between organizing rights (in this instance for adjunct faculty) under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act and the Religious Clause of the First Amendment, which in 1979 the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago precludes the NLRB from becoming entangled in religious issues (in that case the Court held that the NLRB could not require a union election among lay teachers at a Catholic school). This “invitation” asks interested parties to address the appropriate test that the Board should apply under Catholic Bishop and to identify factors it should consider in determining the appropriate standard for asserting jurisdiction. But the invitation goes much further than this question which is only of significance to religiously affiliated institutions.  The underlying Pacific Lutheran University case also includes a claim that the University’s adjunct faculty are managerial under NLRB v. Yeshiva University because, among other things, there are adjuncts who are voting members of the University’s Faculty Assembly, along with their tenured and tenure track faculty.  The invitation, therefore, also requests interested parties to identify those factors that the Board should consider most significant in making a managerial determination, as well as what evidence should be required to establish that faculty “effectively control” decisions.  In particular, the Board has solicited information on whether there have been “developments in models of decision making in private universities since the issuance of Yeshiva that are relevant to the factors the Board should consider in making a determination of faculty managerial status?” What is the significance of this invitation?  It likely signals some significant changes in the near future.  The fact is that unless the Board were inclined to consider some dramatic moves in these two areas, it would not have needed (or wanted) to solicit briefs on these issues.  Stay tuned - given the recent history of this Board, significant change is almost certainly on the horizon.

While not all colleges and universities meet the definition of a “federal contractor,” many do perform contract work for the federal government.  Those institutions will be facing a new minimum wage obligation in connection with any new contracts. On February 12, 2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order requiring that all new federal contracts and subcontracts contain a clause specifying that the minimum wage to be paid to workers under those federal contracts and subcontracts must be at least $10.10 per hour beginning January 1, 2015. The federal contracts and subcontracts covered by this Executive Order include procurement contracts for services or construction and contracts for concessions. This new $10.10 minimum wage will also apply to disabled employees who are currently working under a special certificate issued by the Secretary of Labor permitting payment of less than the minimum wage. Beginning January 1, 2016, and annually thereafter, the minimum wage for federal contractors will be increased by the Secretary of Labor based on the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, and rounded to the nearest multiple of five cents. The Secretary of Labor is required to publish the new minimum wage at least 90 days before the new minimum wage is scheduled to take effect. For those institutions that might utilize tipped employees, the hourly cash wage that must be paid by a federal contractor will be at least $4.90 beginning on January 1, 2015. In each subsequent year, the federal contractor minimum wage for tipped employees will increase by 95 cents until it equals 70 percent of the federal contractor minimum wage in effect for non-tipped employees. If an employee’s tips, when added to the hourly wage, do not add up to the federal contractor minimum wage for non-tipped employees, the federal contractor will be required to supplement the employee’s hourly wage to make up the difference. The Secretary of Labor is expected to issue regulations by October 1, 2014, to implement the provisions of the Executive Order.

Since 1992, the Higher Education Act has required colleges and universities to determine applicants’ eligibility for federal aid programs only through use of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).  On February 3, 2014, Rep. Elijah Cummings, the ranking Democrat on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, sent a letter to Secretary of Education Arne Duncan in which he identified 111 colleges and universities he believes to be requiring applicants to complete forms other than the FAFSA to apply for federal aid. The information set forth in the letter was gleaned from a survey of institutional websites, many of which, the letter claims, reflect the use of forms other than the FAFSA (such as the College Board’s CSS Profile) to determine eligibility for federal IV aid, or, at a minimum, provide unclear guidance to applicants as to whether additional forms are required.  In reality, the majority of institutions are likely administering programs correctly, requiring applicants to complete only the FAFSA for federal aid purposes but using other data collection tools for institutional and other non-federal aid purposes (and encouraging submission of the additional information in order to maximize accessibility).  However, institutions’ descriptive materials may not clearly reflect these compliant practices. It is not clear what, if anything, the Education Department may do in response to Rep. Cummings’ letter.  Although it appears that Rep. Cummings is suggesting only an admonishment to institutions, colleges and universities should use this opportunity to ensure that their website disclosures and other descriptive materials made available to applicants clearly identify that only the FAFSA is required for federal aid purposes (and, of course, that they are administering the application process in a corresponding manner).

It is often said that retaliation claims are much harder to defend than the underlying discrimination claim.  This is at least in part because human nature is such that it is not a stretch to believe that someone falsely branded a discriminator will either look to retaliate against his/her accuser or will not pass up the opportunity to retaliate when circumstances present themselves.  Knowing this, clever would-be plaintiffs, believing that the writing is on the proverbial wall in terms of their own performance deficiencies, often try to lay the foundation for a retaliation claim by engaging in protected activity (complaining about discrimination) prior to their employer pulling the trigger on a termination.  The case law is replete with such efforts.   But what happens when the would-be plaintiff’s complaints go beyond allegations they were being discriminated against? Earlier this month, Judge Leonard Wexler of the Eastern District of New York, in Saliba v. Five Towns College, 2014 WL 92690 (E.D.N.Y. 2014),[1] held that the Plaintiff essentially complained her way out of a Title VII retaliation claim.  The Plaintiff was an Assistant Professor of English at Five Towns College.   She alleged she was terminated for complaining about:  sexual harassment committed by another faculty member against students; illegal drug use; campus security issues; and “rampant corruption” in the administration of the College. In granting the College’s motion to dismiss the complaint,  Judge Wexler held that to the extent Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim was predicated on her complaints about students being harassed, as a matter of law, such complaints did not constitute “protected activity.”  Title VII does not cover complaints about “non-employees,” such as students, being subjected to discrimination.  Additionally, Judge Wexler held that because Plaintiff complained about so many different aspects of the College’s operations that had nothing to do with discrimination, her complaint failed as a matter of law.   Citing the most recent Supreme Court decision on point, Judge Wexler held that Plaintiff was require to show that her protected activity was a “but-for” cause of her termination, not just a motivating factor.   In this case, however, Plaintiffs complaints were not about an employee being the victim of discrimination, but were rather about matters completely outside the scope of the anti-discrimination laws. In light of Saliba, employers facing retaliation claims would be well-served to carefully examine the precise nature of the alleged protected activity and to scrutinize whether such activity was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action.

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With students, faculty and other groups increasingly vocal about institutional responses to campus rape and sexual assault, President Obama has announced the creation of The White House Task Force on Protecting Students from Sexual Assault.  The group will include cabinet level leaders and US Attorney General Eric Holder. Under Title IX, colleges and universities are required to respond promptly to reports of campus rape and sexual assault.  An increasing number of students have filed federal claims of sex discrimination, alleging that their institution had not adequately responded in cases where they have been sexually assaulted.  At the same time, many college administrators have expressed frustration with the US Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights, finding that OCR does not fully understand the realities involved in addressing sexual assault on campuses, particularly when it comes to the student disciplinary process, and that there is confusion regarding exactly what OCR expects of them. The President has charged the Task Force with developing “best practices” for preventing and responding to rape and sexual assaults; to assure compliance with existing federal laws governing colleges; and to make available to the public individual college’s compliance with these laws.  The President also asked the Task Force to improve coordination among federal agencies dealing with this issue, and to increase the transparency of federal enforcement efforts. In announcing the Task Force, the President indicated that the Task Force will look for ways to work collaboratively with colleges to develop these recommendations, though the Task Force will not include any members of the higher education community. The Task Force’s recommendations are to be submitted to the President in 90 days, and a full report on implementing those recommendations is due in one year. Bond will be following closely the work of the Task Force, and will keep clients updated on developments.

Following the lead of North Carolina last year, members of the Virginia legislature have  become the latest to propose legislation to provide students at public colleges and universities the right to attorney representation in on-campus disciplinary proceedings. With narrow exceptions generally arising only at public institutions (e.g., in circumstances where a student faces parallel criminal charges arising out of an incident giving rise to an on-campus proceeding), courts have almost uniformly held that students have no right to counsel during campus disciplinary proceedings.  Even in those circumstances where courts have mandated the presence of an attorney, the attorney has been restricted to providing advice to protect the interests of the student, rather than being permitted to perform a formal advocacy role in which he or she presents a defense on a student’s behalf. Like the 2013 North Carolina law after which it appears to have been modeled, the proposed Virginia legislation would change this equation drastically at public institutions. With limited exceptions for charges of academic dishonesty, any student who is accused of a violation punishable by a suspension of greater than 10 days or expulsion would have the right to be represented, at the student's expense, by a licensed attorney (or nonattorney advocate). If present, the attorney would be entitled to "fully participate" during the proceedings, presumably meaning that counsel would be entitled to present opening and closing arguments, cross-examine witnesses (either directly or through the hearing body), make objections, and generally function in a manner similar to defense counsel in a criminal court.  If this represents the start of a trend in higher education disciplinary law, it is a concerning one.  Colleges and universities do not design their disciplinary systems to function with all of the technicalities of a criminal process, and with good reasons. Campus disciplinary proceedings are designed to be educational in nature, and a core component of the learning experience is a student's ability to speak on his or her own behalf, to take responsibility for his or her behaviors, and to learn from them. Much of this will be lost in the event that students are permitted to have attorneys speak for them throughout the disciplinary process. Reasonable minds can, of course, differ as to whether the foregone educational benefit is outweighed by the need to protect accused students in the context of potentially career-altering additions to their records; however, attorney mandates have other, more significant and less debatable, adverse implications.  Ironically, proponents of these legislative efforts have characterized them as “leveling the playing field” between accused students and their institutions, but the presence of active defense counsel would almost certainly swing the balance in the opposite direction, making it both more difficult and more costly for colleges and universities to regulate conduct on their campuses.  Indeed, the presence of counsel for accused students may well lead an institution to retain counsel on behalf of the disciplinary panel and/or institutional representatives presenting charges, and to allow student complainants to retain private counsel, turning the entire process into a hypertechnical, confrontational and protracted legal proceeding. The potential costs to institutions, both financial and in terms of the functioning of their disciplinary processes, are not insignificant. It may be that the courts and regulatory authorities in jurisdictions adopting attorney mandates will bring some degree of reasonableness to the analysis; for example, it is possible to argue that the right for an attorney to “fully participate during any disciplinary procedure” means that attorneys can only participate to the extent that an institution’s process otherwise allows any advocate to function in the place of an accused student, and/or that institutions may have procedures that limit the role of counsel (e.g., by precluding cross-examination) provided that the procedural limitations are applied even-handedly.  However, this is far from clear, and appears to be contrary to the expectations of those who have sought to implement these reforms. Perhaps more troubling, a mandate to allow active attorney advocacy in on-campus proceedings raises the prospect of serious inequities in the disciplinary process.  For example, although the Virginia legislation (like the North Carolina legislation before it) permits the use of "non-attorney advocates," affluent students who are able to retain the highest quality (and correspondingly highest-priced) counsel may have a greater chance of successfully defending disciplinary proceedings and avoiding responsibility for their actions than will students from underprivileged backgrounds. Similarly, these requirements may have chilling effects on institutions’ ability to address allegations of sexual misconduct, where institutions are required to afford complainants rights equivalent to those granted to accused students. Although this may not translate into a requirement that institutions furnish counsel to complainants in such cases (as noted above, accused students are required to pay for their own counsel), many complainants may not have the financial wherewithal or inclination to retain counsel in such circumstances, so as to enable them to have their accounts presented as effectively as those of their alleged assailants or harassers.  They may also be understandably fearful of the prospect of being cross-examined by defense counsel (directly or, as is common, through the hearing body) in the manner that often proves traumatic in criminal processes. If this increases the reluctance to report sexual misconduct with which so many institutions already struggle, it will be a truly unfortunate byproduct of these legislative efforts to protect student rights. None of this is to say that accused students are not entitled to a process that is fundamentally fair when facing charges of misconduct; this has always been the law, and students sanctioned by institutions already have the right to seek judicial review of disciplinary determinations in most jurisdictions. Thus, colleges and universities are already accountable for their processes, and should of course take steps to ensure that their proceedings are conducted fairly and even-handedly. Moreover, if institutions are concerned that accused students need legal advice to protect their interests, they always have the option to design their procedures to permit (as many do) the presence of counsel to provide quiet advice to the accused.  However, “lawyering up” the entire process by requiring institutions to permit full and active advocacy by counsel would seem, on the whole, to be counterproductive.

As colleges and universities in New York know, new Regulations were recently adopted, effective December 31, 2013, amending the state’s Minimum Wage Orders, including the Minimum Wage Order commonly applicable to not-for-profit higher education institutions. These amendments reflect the statutory increase in New York’s minimum wage to $8.00 per hour, which is already in effect, as well as future scheduled raises in the state minimum wage to $8.75 per hour as of December 31, 2014, and to $9.00 per hour as of December 31, 2015. The relevant provisions of the above-referenced Minimum Wage Order apply to colleges and universities deemed to be “nonprofitmaking institutions.” This term includes:  “any corporation, unincorporated association, community chest, fund or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” While this Minimum Wage Order generally applies the new $8.00 per hour minimum rate, it also continues to provide that bona-fide students working “in or for” such “nonprofitmaking institutions,” e.g., not-for-profit colleges and universities, are exempt from the definition of “employee.”  In other words, these students are exempt from the increased state minimum wage. The term “student” is specifically defined in the applicable Minimum Wage Order as “an individual who is enrolled in and regularly attends during the daytime a course of instruction leading to a degree, certificate or diploma, offered at an institution of learning, or who is completing residence requirements for a degree.”  Further, under this definition, such an individual continues to be a “student” even when school is not in session, so long as she was a student during the preceding semester. However, higher education institutions should remember that the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) does not contain a comparable exemption and, at the present time, federal law independently imposes a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for non-exempt employees.   Thus, hourly student employees must still generally be paid at this federal minimum wage rate for all hours worked, and at time-and-a-half of their “regular rate” for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. At the same time, not all student “work” at higher education institutions constitutes an employment relationship subject to the FLSA and its requirements, although this distinction is not always easy to make.  Additionally, certain full-time students may be paid sub-minimum wages under the FLSA, but higher education institutions must obtain prior approval from the federal Wage & Hour Division. The bottom line is that colleges and universities should carefully examine their minimum wage practices, and practices with students who provide services to ensure compliance with both state and federal law.