On October 28, 2016 the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. This case is about whether a Virginia School Board’s policy limiting students’ bathroom access to facilities that correspond to students’ biological gender is discriminatory. The case was brought by the ACLU, on behalf of transgender student G.G., alleging the School Board’s policy violates G.G.’s rights under the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and is inconsistent with U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance stating that school districts should treat students consistent with their gender identities. While the Fourth Circuit held that OCR guidance, while not law, deserved deference on this issue it stopped short of holding that the School Board’s policy violates Title IX’s protections against sex discrimination.  On August 29, 2016, the School Board petitioned the Supreme Court for review. In response the Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, thus keeping the School Board’s policy in place while it considered whether it would review the case. A decision by the Supreme Court here will not just determine whether this Virginia school board’s policy violates federal civil rights laws. A decision will impact similar transgender policies, laws, and cases under scrutiny in North Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere. This case is further meaningful for the education community as it may provide clarity on the scope of Title IX’s sex discrimination protections and the appropriate weight to afford OCR interpretation of Title IX and other statutes. For more background on Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. see our previous post here.

The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") recently notified a major university that it is being audited, and as part of that audit requested copies of the employment agreements of the president of the university, the provost of the university, and the head coaches of the University’s football team, men’s basketball team, and women’s basketball team. This audit is a reminder to higher education institutions of the importance of making sure that all of their employment agreements and appointment letters fully comply with all of the tax and benefit requirements that apply to such agreements and letters. A failure to comply with these requirements could result in serious adverse tax and benefit consequences for the higher education institution, and for the employees covered by such agreements and letters.

What Are Some of the More Important Tax and Benefit Issues That Should Be Reviewed in the Employment Agreements and Appointment Letters of Higher Education Institutions?

Among the more important tax and benefit issues that should be reviewed in the employment agreements and appointment letters of higher education institutions are the following:

• Compliance With the Deferred Compensation Requirements – The deferred compensation requirements in Sections 409A and 457(f) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Deferred Compensation Requirements") have a very broad scope, and affect numerous provisions in employment agreements and appointment letters that often are not considered to be deferred compensation. If an employment agreement or an appointment letter provides for any taxable payment to be made or any taxable benefit to be provided in a future calendar year, that taxable payment or benefit generally should be structured to be exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements when reasonably possible (if that is not reasonably possible, it should then be structured to comply with the Deferred Compensation Requirements). A failure to satisfy the Deferred Compensation Requirements could result in serious adverse tax consequences, including (1) possible taxation in the year an employment agreement or appointment letter is signed, including income that is scheduled to be paid or provided in a later calendar year, (2) a possible 20 percent tax on the applicable employee, (3) interest penalties in certain circumstances, and (4) corrected IRS Forms W-2 and Forms 990 in certain circumstances.
• Benefit Issues – If an employment agreement or an appointment letter provides any benefit that is in addition to, or exceeds, the benefits that generally are available to other eligible employees on campus, it is important to verify if (1) such benefit is allowed by the terms of the applicable benefit plan, and (2) whether offering such benefit will violate any nondiscrimination requirements under the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). A violation of a plan’s terms or a Code nondiscrimination requirement could, in certain circumstances, result in coverage issues for the applicable employee, serious adverse tax consequences for the employee, and/or loss of a plan’s tax-favored status.
• Compliance With the "Reasonable Compensation" Requirements – The Code has excess benefit transaction provisions that require that no more than "reasonable compensation" be paid to certain persons who are in a position to exercise substantial influence over a covered tax-exempt organization. A failure to satisfy these requirements could result in excise taxes on the persons receiving "unreasonable" compensation, and on any officer, trustee or director who knowingly and willfully approved the "unreasonable" compensation. In egregious circumstances, the tax-exempt status of an organization could be revoked. Some states also have separate "reasonable compensation" requirements.

What Are Examples of Provisions In Employment Agreements and Appointment Letters That Are Subject To the Deferred Compensation Requirements?

Examples of provisions in employment agreements and appointment letters that potentially could be subject to the Deferred Compensation Requirements, and that generally should be structured to be exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements when reasonably possible (such structuring often will require additional language to be added to an employment agreement or appointment letter), include the following:

• Salary Provisions – a salary provision that provides for salary payments to be made in a future calendar year;
• Bonus or Incentive Compensation Provisions – a bonus or incentive compensation provision that could result in a bonus or an incentive compensation payment being paid in a future calendar year;
• Non-Exempt Benefits That Are Taxable – any non-exempt benefit that could result in a taxable benefit or payment being provided in a future calendar year, such as personal use of an automobile or personal use of a club membership (certain types of benefits are exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements, and nontaxable benefits are also exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements);
• Sabbatical Leaves – sabbatical leaves that result in taxable payments being made in a future calendar year;
• Certain Housing Benefits – any housing benefit that is taxable in a future calendar year (even though some housing can be provided on a tax-free basis if certain requirements are satisfied, the IRS has taken the position that some of the expenses that often are incurred with respect to such housing are personal expenses that are taxable);
• Expense Reimbursements That Are Taxable – any reimbursement of a business expense or other expense that is taxable and that could be paid in a future calendar year, such as a taxable reimbursement of spousal travel expenses (nontaxable expense reimbursements are exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements);
• Termination or Severance Payments – any termination or severance payments made in a future calendar year, such as payments owed after a termination without cause that are scheduled to be paid in a future calendar year (if a release agreement is required, the Deferred Compensation Requirements could also apply to the timing of payments made pursuant to that release agreement in certain circumstances);
• Other Provisions Providing Taxable Payments After Employment Ends – other provisions that provide taxable payments after employment ends and in a future calendar year (e.g., payments in a future calendar year for consulting services or for moving expenses); and
• Indemnification Provisions – indemnification provisions that provide for the possible reimbursement of certain expenses in a future calendar year.

Consideration should be given to adding a construction clause in each employment agreement (and in certain appointment letters when it would be helpful) that provides that the agreement or letter is intended to comply with any applicable Deferred Compensation Requirements, and should be construed in a manner that is consistent with the intent that the agreement or letter not be subject to the premature income recognition or adverse tax provisions of the Deferred Compensation Requirements. The IRS has indicated that it will give deference to such a construction clause in certain circumstances.

Each employment agreement and appointment letter should have language reserving the right of the university or college to withhold any required taxes with respect to any taxable payment or benefit described in the agreement or letter.

What Are Some of the More Important Benefit Issues That Should Be Addressed In Employment Agreements and Appointment Letters?

Among the more important issues that could arise when a benefit is being provided in in an employment agreement or an appointment letter is the extent to which the benefit is: (1) taxable; and (2) different than what is generally available to other employees on campus.

If a benefit is taxable and payable in a future calendar year, it generally should be structured to be exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements whenever reasonably possible. If it is not reasonably possible to structure the benefit to be exempt from the Deferred Compensation Requirements, it should be structured to comply with the Deferred Compensation Requirements.

If an employment agreement or appointment letter is providing a benefit that is different than what is generally available to other employees on campus, it is important to first check the terms of the applicable benefit plan, program, or policy to make sure the university or college has the authority to provide such a benefit (e.g., if an employment agreement or appointment letter is providing health or retirement benefits during a period when the applicable employee is not rendering any services, the terms of the applicable health or retirement plan should be reviewed to verify that benefits can be provided at a time when no services are being rendered). Such verification is especially important if the applicable benefit is being provided pursuant to a tax-favored retirement plan (a failure to follow the terms of a tax-favored retirement plan could jeopardize the tax-favored status of that plan) or an insured plan (e.g., a failure to comply with the terms of an insured health plan could result in an insurer refusing to provide coverage). It also is important to determine whether any different benefit that is being offered is subject to nondiscrimination requirements under the Code. Such nondiscrimination requirements generally preclude the applicable benefit being provided in a way that discriminates in favor of highly compensated employees, highly compensated individuals, or key employees (depending upon the applicable benefit). Examples of benefits that are subject to such nondiscrimination requirements include:

• tax-favored retirement plans (e.g., tax-sheltered annuity plans under Section 403(b) of the Code, and qualified retirement plans under Section 401(a) of the Code);
• self-insured health benefits (the Affordable Care Act imposed similar nondiscrimination requirements on insured health plans, but the IRS has issued a moratorium on those requirements until such time as it specifies otherwise);
• qualified tuition reduction benefits that provide free or discounted tuition benefits to employees, spouses of employees, eligible dependents of employees, and certain other persons if the requirements of the Code are satisfied;
• group-term life insurance benefits;
• pre-tax benefits under a cafeteria plan (including separate nondiscrimination requirements for dependent care assistance benefits and health flexible spending account benefits);
• educational assistance plans (under Section 127 of the Code);
• no-additional-cost service benefits and qualified discount benefits; and
• adoption assistance benefits.

What Are Some of the More Important Steps Covered Universities and Colleges Should Take To Comply With the "Reasonable Compensation" Requirements?

To the extent a university or college is subject to the "reasonable compensation" requirements under the Code, it will want to take the following steps, among others, to comply with those "reasonable compensation" requirements:

• identify which employees and other persons have the type of substantial influence necessary to be subject to the "reasonable compensation" requirements (such employees and persons are referred to in the statute as "Disqualified Persons");
• assemble appropriate comparability data regarding the total compensation and benefits being paid to similar persons at comparable organizations;
• arrange to have a properly authorized body of the university or college review the appropriate comparability data for each Disqualified Person, and, after confirming that no member of the authorized body has a conflict of interest, make a decision as to whether the total compensation and benefits being provided to each Disqualified Person are reasonable; and
• document, in a timely and proper manner, any decision made regarding the reasonableness of compensation paid to a Disqualified Person.

Any university or college subject to these "reasonable compensation" requirements generally should have written procedures in place that will help ensure that the required "reasonable compensation" analysis is done whenever there is an increase in compensation or benefits for a Disqualified Person. Certain state universities and colleges are exempt from these "reasonable compensation" requirements.

Some states have implemented reasonable compensation requirements, and to the extent those requirements are applicable they also will need to be taken into account.

The Supreme Court of the United States has denied both the NCAA’s and plaintiffs’ petitions for certiorari in the O’Bannon case.  The parties had petitioned for review of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision issued in September 2015. In that decision, the Ninth Circuit sided with the NCAA by vacating that portion of the District Court’s decision that would have required the NCAA to allow member institutions to pay limited deferred compensation to student-athletes for the use of their names, images and likenesses. At the same time, the Ninth Circuit also partly favored plaintiffs by upholding that part of the District Court’s ruling that enjoined the NCAA from enforcing its rules precluding member institutions from providing athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance. The Supreme Court’s denial, which signifies only that it declined to review the case and not that it agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, means that the Ninth Circuit’s decision will stand unchanged.

Citing the ongoing nationwide dialogue on law enforcement-community relations, racial justice and officer and public safety, on September 8 the U.S. Department of Education (in coordination with the Justice Department) released a Dear Colleague  Letter providing guidance to colleges and universities with respect to its expectations for campus policing.   In the main, the guidance encourages institutions to adopt and implement “applicable” recommendations from the Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing .   As noted by the Department, the Task Force Report covers topics including  “changing the culture of policing, embracing community policing concepts, ensuring fair and impartial policing, focusing on officer wellness and safety, implementing new technologies, and building community capital.” The Department encourages institutions to use the Task Force Report as a “template for self-assessment and organizational change,” with adjustments appropriate to context (for example, suggesting that in the campus environment, community engagement efforts should include diverse members of an institution’s campus community such as students, faculty, staff, and administrators, as well as community advocacy groups with relevant expertise). The Department’s guidance also reiterates institutions’ security-oriented obligations under the Clery Act and applicable federal civil rights statutes.

The National Labor Relations Board (Board), in Columbia University , has issued a 3-1 decision holding that graduate, and undergraduate, student assistants are common law employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and therefore are eligible to organize and bargain collectively under federal labor law.  In so doing, the Board overruled its 2004 determination in Brown University.    Board Member Miscimarra wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the educational nature of the relationship between student and educational institution should dictate that student assistants are not employees and therefore they should not be eligible to organize and bargain collectively. After much speculation, and following an invitation for briefing in December 2015, the NLRB rejected the Brown holding that graduate assistants cannot be statutory employees because they are “primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their university.”  The Board first noted that it has the statutory authority to treat student assistants as statutory employees.  The Board applied a common law test and indicated that when student assistants perform “work,” at the direction of a college or university, for which they are compensated, a common law employment relationship will be deemed to exist and the students will be eligible to organize and bargain collectively. The Board indicated that the new test will apply to all student assistants, including graduate assistants engaged in research funded by external grants (and subject to the conditions of those grants). The Board also determined that the petitioned for bargaining unit at Columbia -- which included graduate students, terminal Master’s degree students, and undergraduate students -- constituted an appropriate unit and that none of the petitioned for classifications consisted of temporary employees who should be excluded from the unit.  Finally, the Board remanded the case to the Regional Director for consideration of whether student assistants not currently performing their assistant duties should be eligible to vote based upon a continuing expectation of future common law employment. The Board’s decision was long the subject of speculation and has been anticipated by many commentators. In the wake of the decision, colleges and universities should anticipate increased organizing activity on their campuses and will have the obligation to bargain with units comprised of student assistants if they are recognized after an NLRB election.  Given the breadth of the Board’s decision, and the potential units that could be petitioned for by unions, this decision has the potential to represent a significant challenge if broad units of student assistants are voted in and certified under NLRB procedures.

On August 21, 2016, in a case entitled State of Texas et al. v. United States of America et al ., Judge Reed O’Connor of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the United States government (specifically, the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education (“OCR”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) from enforcing the terms of the May 13, 2016 Dear Colleague Letter issued by OCR and DOJ. As institutions are aware , the Dear Colleague Letter articulated OCR’s and DOJ’s interpretation of Title IX and its implementing regulations as requiring K-12 schools, colleges and universities to treat a student’s gender identity as the student’s “sex” for purposes of Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex, and described several areas where schools and institutions must provide transgender students with equal access to education programs and activities “even in circumstances in which other students, parents and community members raise objections or concerns.” In reaching its decision, the Court found that there was a likelihood that the plaintiffs (13 states and two school districts) would prevail on their claim that the Departments’ interpretation of Title IX is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its implementing regulations, and is therefore incorrect as a matter of law. Specifically, the Court determined that the term “sex,” as understood at the time that the statute and regulations were initially adopted, was understood to refer to an individual’s biological sex, rather than the individual’s gender identity. Perhaps more significantly, in an aspect of the decision that could impact OCR’s enforcement strategy in other areas, the Court also determined that OCR and DOJ were required to comply with the federal Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) prior to issuing the Dear Colleague Letter, and that their failure to do so rendered the Dear Colleague Letter invalid. By way of background, the APA requires federal agencies to publish proposed rules in the Federal Register, and to provide the public a period of time to comment on them (this is commonly referred to as the “notice and comment” process). The purpose of this requirement is to enable an agency to consider the perspectives of persons or entities that would be impacted by proposed rules before they are finalized.  However, not every action an agency takes is required to go through the notice and comment process, and the APA specifically excludes from its ambit agency pronouncements that amount merely to interpretations of existing rules (rather than the imposition of new substantive requirements). In concluding that OCR and DOJ were required (and failed) to comply with the APA prior to issuing the Dear Colleague Letter, the Court noted that OCR and DOJ have applied the guidance contained in the Dear Colleague Letter as if it were binding law in a manner different than the underlying regulation had previously been applied, and that the guidance is “compulsory in nature” in that schools must comply with the guidance or be deemed in breach of their Title IX obligations. This decision is obviously significant insofar as it impacts the enforceability of the May 13, 2016 Dear Colleague Letter. However, colleges and universities that have voluntarily implemented measures consistent with the Dear Colleague Letter may certainly continue to do so, unless they are located in states that have adopted legislation prohibiting such action.   Where the decision (or, at a minimum, the reasoning underlying the decision) may have a greater impact is in its potential effect on OCR’s subregulatory guidance with respect to institutions’ obligations to prevent and address sexual violence (e.g., OCR’s April 3, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter  and its April 29, 2014 Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence). Although the arguments for and against the validity of OCR’s substantive interpretation of Title IX are different as between these two subject areas, there are certainly parallels between OCR’s use of purported subregulatory guidance on both issues.  Indeed, the District Court noted the impact of the May 13, 2016 Dear Colleague Letter on institutions, as evidenced by the government’s efforts to enforce its requirements, as a significant factor in characterizing it as legislative (and thus subject to the APA) rather than interpretive in nature, and OCR’s enforcement of its guidance on sexual violence is undeniable, with over 250 active investigations at more than 200 institutions currently pending. It is certainly possible, and perhaps even likely, that the federal government will appeal the Court’s decision in State of Texas, and in any event OCR can be expected to assert that the Court’s rationale does not apply to its guidance on sexual violence.  However, the Court’s decision will certainly be used in support of pending litigation challenging the validity of OCR’s guidance on sexual violence, and in connection with congressional efforts to overturn that guidance.  Needless to say, the situation merits further watching.

New management agreement guidelines were issued by the IRS today in a new Revenue Procedure (Rev. Proc.) 2016-44.  Rev_Proc_2016-44 provides revised safe harbors under which a private management contract does not result in impermissible private business use of projects financed with tax-exempt bonds.  The former limits on fixed and variable compensation in management contracts involving tax-exempt bond financed facilities have been eliminated. Rev. Proc. 2016-44 will be published in Internal Revenue Bulletin Number 2016-36, dated September 6, 2016. These revised safe harbors give colleges and universities the ability to enter into management contracts with private entities to manage or operate tax-exempt bond financed projects with more flexibility for incentives in reasonable compensation arrangements and longer terms of up to 30 years (subject to an economic life limit). The revised safe harbors also remove the previous requirements for prescribed percentages of fixed compensation for management contracts for different time periods. The revised safe harbors continue a longstanding existing prohibition against sharing of net profits, and add certain new principles-based constraints (governmental control, governmental risk of loss, and no inconsistent tax positions by private service providers). The revised safe harbors are effective for any management contract that is entered into on or after August 22, 2016.

Three lawsuits filed in early August suggest that plaintiffs’ law firms, representing employees of colleges and universities, are looking at higher education retirement plans as potential targets for lawsuits seeking millions of dollars in damages. The New York Times reported[1] that class action lawsuits were commenced on August 9, 2016 against three prominent universities – New York University, Yale, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – alleging that the schools had allowed their employees to be charged excessive fees on their retirement savings.  The law firm bringing the lawsuits – Schlichter Bogard & Denton – has already brought and settled many similar lawsuits against companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Novant Health, for amounts in the tens of millions of dollars.  The Lockheed Martin settlement, for example, was for $62 million.  The new lawsuits suggest that Schlichter, and potentially other plaintiffs’ law firms, are now looking at college and university plans as potential targets for similar kinds of claims. The new lawsuits are putative class actions, which means that the law firm represents certain named employees who are participants in the universities’ retirement plans, and purports to represent all other similarly situated employee participants – plaintiff classes that may have thousands of members each. Once a handful of the college or university’s employees agree to be part of the lawsuit, it can be brought on behalf of all the employees in the retirement plan. The claims against NYU, MIT and Yale are similar to claims made in many of the previous retirement plan lawsuits brought by the Schlichter firm and others: that retirement plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to prudently select investment vehicles for the plans so as to maximize returns, often by  minimizing fees.[2] Under ERISA, the “fiduciaries” of a covered retirement plan – plan fiduciaries can include administrative and investment committees and, frequently, officers and other members of management of the college or university – are subject to strict fiduciary responsibilities and can be held personally liable for any losses caused by a breach of these duties.  In short, it means the college or university is obligated to administer the retirement plan funds of employees in a manner that results in the highest possible prudent growth. Beginning about ten years ago, a wave of lawsuits have been brought on behalf of retirement plan participants alleging that fiduciaries had breached their duties by selecting improper investment options, and in particular by allowing excessive fees to be paid from plan assets. If the investment fees paid by a retirement plan are deemed to be excessive, even by a seemingly small margin, the aggregate losses over an employee’s working career can be very large.  A frequently cited calculation stated in a U.S. Department of Labor publication more than 10 years ago – and repeated in the Times article – recites that if investment fees are one percentage point higher than a reasonable amount, the participant’s retirement account will be 28 percent lower after a 35 year career.  If that is true, then for large plans (like those sponsored by the three universities), the potential losses are enormous – the complaint against MIT alleges that the plan could have saved more than $8 million in fees in a single year by selecting investments prudently. (The complaint’s damage claim is of course not limited to a single year’s losses.) Significantly, these lawsuits also involve claims against major college and university retirement plan managers, including TIAA-CREF and Fidelity.  Accordingly, any college currently using these companies for its employee retirement plans could face some of the same claims. To reduce the risk of liability going forward, retirement plan fiduciaries should, among other things:

• exercise “procedural prudence” in analyzing, vetting, and selecting investment options and advisors for the retirement plan, with a view to the risk, return and cost characteristics of each investment and the plan portfolio as a whole,
• continually monitor the chosen investments and make changes if and when appropriate,
• discuss fees and fee options with retirement plan companies to secure the most favorable arrangements for employees,
• require that retirement plan managers disclose fees and charges so they may be communicated to employees;
• avoid any conflicts of interest in the selection and monitoring processes, and
• consult with third party advisors whenever “in-house” fiduciaries lack necessary expertise.

Colleges and universities may also want to confer with existing retirement plan managers regarding responses to questions which may arise at this time from employees about current retirement plans. Attorneys in Bond Schoeneck & King’s Employee Benefits Practice Group frequently counsel clients with respect to best practices for fulfilling fiduciary duties and avoiding ERISA liability. Often this takes the form of “fiduciary training” we provide to retirement plan committees and other plan fiduciaries.  In addition, the firm’s Litigation Group has substantial experience in defending ERISA lawsuits. [1] Tara Siegel Bernard, “M.I.T., N.Y.U. and Yale Are Sued Over Retirement Plan Fees”, NY Times (Aug. 9. 2016, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/10/your-money/mit-nyu-yale-sued-4013b-retirement-plan-fees-tiaa-fidelity.html. [2] We discussed some of the numerous issues pertinent to these types of claims in previous Memoranda – , for example: ERISA Fiduciary Guidance - Fairness for Defined Contribution Fees, and ERISA Fiduciary Guidance - Making a "Watch List" Work.  

On July 1, 2016 the U.S. Department of Education issued a follow-up Dear Colleague Letter to the Dear Colleague Letter of July 29, 2015. This most recent letter reminds institutions of their legal obligation to protect student data under Title IV and sets forth the new standards and methods the DOE will use when evaluating data security compliance. An institution’s Title IV Program Participation Agreement (PPA) requires that they must protect all student financial aid data. The Student Aid Internet Gateway (SAIG) Enrollment Agreement, the system used by educational institutions and third-party servicers to exchange data electronically with the U.S. Department of Education, contains similar requirements. In addition, the letter reminds institutions that the specific requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) governing data security at financial services organizations apply to post-secondary institutions. These include implementing a written information security program, designating an individual to coordinate information security, performing ongoing risk assessments, and properly vetting third-party service providers. It is also noted that compliance with the GLBA will be incorporated into the DOE’s annual student aid compliance audit requirements. Most significantly, the letter “strongly encourages institutions to review and understand the standards defined in NIST SP 800-171.”  These standards were developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to protect sensitive federal information that is used and stored in non-federal information systems and organizations. NIST SP 800-171 sets forth a significant expansion of the data security requirements and controls expected in the handling of student financial aid data and other types of federal data and information. In citing these standards, the DOE acknowledges “the investment and effort by institutions to meet and maintain the standards set forth in NIST SP 800-171” but “strongly encourages those institutions that fall short of NIST standards to assess their current gaps and immediately begin to design and implement plans to close those gaps using NIST standards as a model.” The message from the US DOE is clear – institutions of higher education that use student financial aid data, and other forms of federal data are expected to “immediately” begin to integrate the specific requirements of NIST SP-171.

The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting (the “Handbook”), which provides important guidance for institutions as it relates to their compliance with the Clery Act’s safety and security requirements, was recently revised and a new version (the 2016 Edition) released by the United States Department of Education. This valuable resource had not been updated since 2011.  The 2016 Edition of the Handbook contains updated provisions with respect to, among other things, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.

The 2016 Edition of the Handbook, which replaces all previous versions of the Handbook, can be accessed here.

The New York State Education Department has activated its electronic submission system for institutions to file certificates of compliance with Education Law Articles 129-A and 129-B, as well as the copies of rules and policies required to be filed this year pursuant to Article 129-B.  A link to the portal, as well as instructions for using it, can be found on the Department's website. When making the required Article 129-B filings, institutions are instructed to submit only the documentation specified in the portal, and not copies of MOUs, training session rosters or other materials required or necessitated by Article 129-B's provisions.  Rather, these documents should be retained by the institution as evidence of compliance and provided to the Department, upon request, in connection with compliance monitoring or auditing. All filings are due by July 1, 2016, (though institutions do not risk loss of State funding for failure to file until September 1).

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in its admissions policies and procedures by rendering a decision in the second case brought by Abigail Fisher, a white woman who was rejected for admission to UT Austin over eight years ago. In June 2013, the Supreme Court remanded Ms. Fisher’s case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit so it could reconsider the constitutionality of the university’s race-conscious admissions policies and procedures under the strict scrutiny standard articulated in prior affirmative action Supreme Court decisions.  In July 2014, the Fifth Circuit again held in favor of UT Austin, finding that its use of race in admissions was constitutional since the university had considered race-neutral alternatives in its admissions process and still could not achieve sufficient diversity.  Dissatisfied, Ms. Fisher appealed to the Supreme Court again, arguing that UT Austin’s use of race in its admissions process disadvantaged her and other non-minority applicants. In yesterday’s Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin decision, the Supreme Court found that UT Austin’s use of race in its admissions process meets the strict scrutiny standard since the university’s goal to provide its students with educational benefits that result from having a diverse student body advances a compelling interest.  Further, the Court found that UT Austin validly demonstrated that race-neutral alternatives (e.g., scholarships, outreach programs, etc.) were not sufficient to achieve a diverse student body, even when used in conjunction with Texas’ Ten Percent Plan which guarantees Texas students graduating in the top tenth of their class admission to a public college or university of their choice in the state. While this decision puts an end to Ms. Fisher’s case against UT Austin and appears to be a win for the use of affirmative action by colleges and universities in admissions, the Court’s decision did include a warning to UT Austin – and colleges and universities across the country -- that the need for race-conscious admissions processes may change over time. In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy stressed that institutions must periodically reassess the constitutionality of their admissions processes and procedures.  Specifically, he stated that the university “must continue to . . . scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary.”  Given this charge, colleges and universities that use race as a factor in their admissions process should avoid complacency and periodically audit their policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the Court’s mandate.